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Abstract
Essays on Frictional Labor Markets and Measurement
by
Christine Braun
This dissertation consists of three works which consider how frictional labor market
models align with data, as well as how labor market data should be combined and used
in applications of theoretical models. What unies these essays is the underlying goal to
further the consolidation of theoretical labor market models with empirical observations
of worker and rm behavior in order to better understand and inuence policy.
The rst essay asks the question: How do changes in the minimum wage aect crim-
inal activity? I answer this question by describing a frictional world in which a worker's
criminal actions are linked to his labor market outcomes. The model is calibrated to
match labor market outcomes and crime decisions of workers from the National Longi-
tudinal Survey of Youth 1997, and shows that the relationship between the aggregate
crime rate and the minimum wage is U-shaped. The results from the calibrated model
as well as empirical evidence from county level crime data and state level minimum wage
changes from 1995 to 2014 suggest that the crime minimizing minimum to median wage
ratio for 16-19 year olds is 0.91. However, the welfare maximizing minimum to median
wage ratio is 0.87, not equal to the crime minimizing value.
The second essay, joint with Ben Griy, Bryan Engelhardt and Peter Rupert, asks
the question: Is the arrival rate of a job independent of the wage that it pays? We an-
swer this question by testing how, and to what extent, unemployment insurance changes
the hazard rate of leaving unemployment across the wage distribution using a Mixed
Proportional Hazard Competing Risk Model and data from the 1997 National Longitu-
viii
dinal Survey of Youth. Controlling for worker characteristics we reject that job arrival
rates are independent of the wages oered. We apply the results to several prominent
job-search models and interpret how our ndings are key to determining the ecacy of
unemployment insurance.
Finally, the third essay, joint with Finn Kydland and Peter Rupert argues that not
all hours are created equally. In this paper we present a method for adjusting aggregate
hours to account for changes in the quality of hours worked. Average human capital
has rapidly increased since 1980 as better educated cohorts enter the workforce and the
baby boomers continue to work and gather experience. We construct an aggregate labor
input series from 1979 to adjust for changes in the experience and education levels of the
workforce using the Current Population Survey's Outgoing Rotation Groups. We show
that a decrease in labor productivity beginning in 2004, the \productivity slowdown," is
understated by 23 percentage points when using aggregate hours instead of labor input
to calculate productivity, and that 80% of the average quarterly growth rate of labor
productivity can be attributed to increases in education and experience since 2004.
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Chapter 1
Crime and the Minimum Wage
1.1 Introduction
The minimum wage has once again made it to the front lines of political discussion
in the United States. Both the Democratic and Republican party have come out in favor
of substantial increases. An unprecedented number of cities have proposed legislation
for higher local minimum wages and for the rst time ever, a majority of states have
minimum wages higher than the federal level. California and New York City have passed
laws raising the minimum wage to $15 within a few years, bringing about some of the
largest real increases since 1949. Economists have long debated the labor market eects
of a minimum wage, dating back to Stigler (1946) who rst drew attention to possible
employment eects after a 21% erosion of the real wage oor induced a public outcry
for a higher minimum. While nearly all of the arguments hinge on employment, in this
paper I ask how changes in the minimum wage aect criminal activity? Given that the
policy is primarily aimed at improving labor market conditions for young and unskilled
workers, who are also most at risk in terms of criminal activity, see Figure 1.1, potential
changes in crime should be part of the policy debate.
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Many economists have tested how the decision to commit crimes changes with respect
to the probability or severity of punishment.1 However, it was not until Schmidt and
Witte (1984) and Grogger (1998) that they began to test the eects of labor market
changes on people's criminal actions. The conclusions from these studies are as economic
theory suggests: people choose to commit more crimes when unemployment increases
Figure 1.1: Characteristics of Minimum Wage Workers and Criminals
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Notes: Plotted in blue is the percent distribution of hourly workers working at or below the
minimum wage by age in 2012. The data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Char-
acteristics of Minimum Wage Workers Report. Plotted in green is the percent distribution
of arrests for Type 1 Property Crimes as dened by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) by age in 2012. The data come from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports.
1See for example: Becker (1968); Ehrlich (1973); Myers (1983); Grogger (1991); Owens (2009);
Hansen (1993)
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and less when they receive higher wages.2 Therefore, economic theory alone can not
determine how an increase in the minimum wage will aect the crime rate. Increasing
the minimum wage can raise wages for workers, thus deterring them from crime. How-
ever, there exists empirical evidence that the minimum wage will displace some workers
from jobs,3 thus enticing them to commit more crimes. The employment eects from
the minimum wage on specically teen employment (the focus of this paper) is mixed;
Allegretto et al. (2010) nding no signicant employment eects and Neumark et al.
(2014) nding signicant employment eects on teens with estimated elasticities around
 0:3. Although the literature is mixed, I show that the model presented below exhibits
small employment eects, similar to those estimated in the empirical literature.
To nd the direction of the eect, I use a search-theoretic framework to describe a
world in which people make crime and labor market decisions jointly. I calibrate the
model to match aggregate statistics of crime and the labor market to analyze the quan-
titative implications of changing the minimum wage. The existing literature trying to
identify and quantify the eect of the minimum wage on crime rates is sparse. Hashimoto
(1987) nds evidence of a positive relationship using national time-series data of the min-
imum wage and teenage arrest rates relative to adults.4 In a recent micro-level study,
Beauchamp and Chan (2014) nd a positive eect of minimum wage increases on crime
for people employed at a binding wage. I focus on a general equilibrium analysis in which
2For a more recent literature rearming these results see Gould et al. (2002), Mocan and Unel
(2011), Machin and Hansen (2003) and Schnepel (2014) for estimates of the elasticity of crime with
respect to wages and Gould et al. (2002), Corman and Mocan (2005) and Lin (2008) for estimates of an
elasticity of crime with respect to unemployment.
3See Neumark and Wascher (2007) for a review of how changes in the minimum wage aect labor
market conditions. For new evidence from the Seattle minimum wage increases see Jardim et al. (2017).
4Hashimoto (1987) is limited by the use of national data which may lose much of its identifying
variation through aggregation and is subject to spurious correlations.
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the minimum wage can change all workers' crime decisions and examine the eect on the
aggregate crime rate. Both increased schooling and work have been proposed as methods
for reducing youth crime rates. Grogger (1998) nds the elasticity of crime with respect
to wages for teens to be  0:18 while ? nd that an increase of one year of schooling
decreases teen arrest rates by 0:1   0:3 implying similar returns. Therefore, increasing
the minimum wage could be a policy tool that is as eective as education for decreasing
teen crime rates as long as the negative employment eects are outweighed by the wage
eects. To eectively implement the minimum wage as a policy tool for deterring teens
from crime it is crucial to know for what level of minimum wage each eect dominates {
which is exactly the goal of this paper.
The basic structure of the model is as follows: in the labor market, workers receive job
oers at an exogenous rate and wages are determined by strategic bargaining between
workers and rms. Workers are heterogeneous in ability which inuences their labor
market outcomes; heterogeneity among workers is essential for analyzing the eects of
a minimum wage policy on labor market outcomes, since not all workers are aected
equally.5 For the minimum wage to have positive welfare eects, rms must have some
monopsony power; search frictions and match specic productivity create monopsony
power for the rms which shifts the gains from trade toward the rm. In the model, the
minimum wage will act as a policy tool that can be used to shift some of the gains from
trade back to the worker.
The crime market is as in Burdett et al. (2003), workers receive random crime oppor-
tunities while employed and unemployed. I add two levels of heterogeneity to capture
two important interactions between changes in the labor market and the crime market.
5Meyer andWise (1983a) and Meyer andWise (1983b) provide evidence of heterogeneities by showing
that the eect of a minimum wage on employment and earnings dier across the group of workers for
which it is binding.
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First, in contrast to other models of crime and the labor market, workers are ex-ante
heterogeneous in ability, making the stock of criminals endogenous and allowing changes
in the labor market to have an extensive eect on crime. This extensive eect is also
modeled in Huang et al. (2004), where workers specialize in criminal activities, however
among those that commit crimes, their propensity for criminal behavior is identical. In
contrast, in Burdett et al. (2003) all workers are criminals and have the same propen-
sity for criminal behavior therefore changes in labor market conditions will not have an
extensive eect on crime. In Engelhardt et al. (2008) all workers commit crimes with
propensities diering across employment states, again changes in labor market conditions
will not have an extensive eect on crime as everyone is a criminal. Second, matches are
ex-post heterogeneous with respect to productivity, allowing the \quality" of a job to
enter into the worker's crime decision, and creating a range of wages for which he com-
mits crimes, in contrast to a single criminal wage as in Burdett et al. (2003) and Burdett
et al. (2004). Therefore changes in labor market outcomes can have an intensive eect
on crime, changing the propensity for criminal behavior dierentially across individuals.
Including this intensive eect on crime creates the wage eect: when the minimum wage
increases, wages increase and the criminal propensity for those committing crimes while
employed decreases. In the model, the minimum wage will also act as a policy tool used
to deter workers from crime and decrease the prison population. Indeed, the minimum
wage has multiple roles, lessening the eects of monopsony power, as well as deterring
the worker from crime. To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst study to investigate
both roles in a general equilibrium model.
Using the benchmark model, I introduce a minimum wage by imposing a constraint
on the bargaining problem faced by rms and workers. The model is calibrated to match
the crime decisions and labor market outcomes of 16-19 year olds from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 in 1998. I vet the model by simulating data and esti-
5
Crime and the Minimum Wage Chapter 1
mating the elasticity of crime with respect to wages and the elasticity of employment with
respect to the minimum wage - nding that the model generated elasticities, although
not targeted in the calibration, are similar to those found in the empirical literature.
Increasing the minimum wage within the calibrated model reveals a non-monotomic, U-
shape relationship between the minimum wage and the crime rate. The results from the
calibrated model and empirical evidence from county level crime data and state level
minimum wage changes from 1995 to 2014 suggest that the crime minimizing minimum
to median wage ratio for 16-19 year olds is 0.91. However, welfare is not maximized
when crime is minimized. The welfare maximizing minimum to median wage ratio is
0.87, which leaves crime at 0.02 crimes per person per month higher than the crime min-
imizing minimum to median wage ratio. If policy makers abstract from the eect of a
minimum wage on crime, the welfare maximizing minimum to median wage ratio is 0.7,
leaving crime 42% higher than when considering the eects of the wage oor on crime.
In sum, the results from the calibrated model suggest that real changes in the wage
oor as large as those passed in California and New York City may have the unintended
consequence of boosting criminal activity among young and unskilled workers.
1.2 Model
To begin, I describe a world in which people in the labor market receive both ex-
ogenous job and crime opportunities and show how they jointly decide whether or not
to take a job or act on a crime opportunity in the absence of a binding minimum wage.
The question of interest is: how does a binding minimum wage change the behavior of a
worker? How does it change his decision to accept jobs and act on crime opportunities,
and in turn how do these changes translate into the aggregate crime rate? To answer
these questions, I introduce a minimum wage into the model as a constraint that workers
6
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and rms must consider when bargaining over the wage. Using the theoretical frame-
work, I analyze how the existence of such a constraint changes employment decisions and
subsequently wages, as well as the crime decisions of employed and unemployed workers.
1.2.1 Workers
The model is in continuous time and composed of a unit measure of workers, who:
are risk neutral, discount at rate r, and are ex-ante heterogeneous in their ability, a,
given by the c.d.f. F (a). There exists an exogenous distribution of jobs of productivity 
with c.d.f. G(). While unemployed, a worker receives ow utility b and matches with a
job at exogenous rate j. When a worker of ability a matches with a job of productivity
 the total productivity of the match is a.6 Wages for the match are determined by
strategic bargaining a la Rubinstein's alternating oers, discussed in detail below, and
workers separate from jobs at exogenous rate .
Workers also receive opportunities to commit crimes at rate u while unemployed and
e while employed. If the worker receives a crime opportunity he has the chance to steal
some xed amount g. If a worker commits a crime, the probability he is caught and sent
to jail is . The decision to act on a crime opportunity is based on the expected cost and
expected utility from committing the crime. Given the probability is zero that a worker
receives both a crime and job opportunity, the expected utility from committing a crime
while unemployed, Ku(a), is equal to the instantaneous gain from committing the crime,
g, and the weighted average of his continued state: his prison utility if he is caught or his
unemployment utility if he is not. The expected utility from committing a crime while
6This assumption is similar to Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Cahuc et al. (2006) who estimate
the productivity of a match to have a rm and individual component.
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employed, Ke(a; ), is calculated analogously. Therefore,
Ku(a) = g + Vp(a) + (1  )Vu(a) (1.1)
Ke(a; ) = g + Vp(a) + (1  )Ve(a; ) (1.2)
where, Vp(a) is the value of prison, Vu(a) is the value of unemployment, and Ve(a; ) is the
value of being employed at a job with productivity , all dened below. Workers commit
crimes rationally; if the expected gain (Ku(a) Vu(a)) of committing the crime is greater
than zero a worker will choose to act on the opportunity. Given a crime opportunity, let
u(a) and e(a; ) be the probability that a worker commits a crime while unemployed
and employed at a job of productivity . The crime decisions for an unemployed and an
employed worker are:
u(a) =

1 if g + (Vp(a)  Vu(a)) > 0
0 if g + (Vp(a)  Vu(a))  0; (1.3)
e(a; ) =

1 if g + (Vp(a)  Ve(a; )) > 0
0 if g + (Vp(a)  Ve(a; ))  0: (1.4)
Both employed and unemployed workers can be victims of crime at rate ; victims
of crime suer a loss of L. The ow return to being unemployed for a worker of ability
a, rVu(a), is equal to the ow utility of unemployment times the workers ability
7, net
of being a victim of crime plus the expected value of receiving either a crime or job
opportunity:
rVu(a) = ab  L+ uu[Ku(a)  Vu(a)] + j
Z

maxfVe(a; )  Vu(a); 0g dG() (1.5)
Similarly, the ow return of employment for a worker of ability a employed at a job
with productivity  is:
rVe(; a) = w(a; )  L+ ee(a; )[Ke(a; )  Ve(a; )] + [Vu(a)  Ve(a; )] (1.6)
7This assumption is similar to those made in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Flinn and Mullins
(2015).
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where w(a; ) is the wage paid to the worker. Workers in prison receive ow value z and
are exogenously released at rate . All workers released from prison are released into
unemployment. The ow return of prison is:
rVp(a) = z + (Vu(a)  Vp(a)): (1.7)
Notice from equation (1.3) that the crime decision of an unemployed worker is only a
function of his unemployment value. Therefore, there exits a unique value of unemploy-
ment that makes workers indierent to committing crimes while unemployed:
Vu(a)
 =
g(r + )
r
+
z
r
: (1.8)
If Vu(a) < Vu(a)
, the worker will commit crimes while unemployed and if Vu(a)  Vu(a)
he will not. Since Vu(a) is strictly increasing in a, there exits a unique ability, a
, such
that Vu(a
) = Vu(a), and workers with ability a < a commit crimes while unemployed,
while workers with ability a  a do not. Proposition 1 proves that workers who do not
commit crimes while unemployed also forge crime opportunities while employed. Since
workers with ability greater than a will never commit crimes, F (a) can be thought of
as the stock of criminals in the economy.
Proposition 1. If a  a then e(a; ) = 0 for all   R(a). Where R(a) is the
workers reservation job productivity dened as Ve(a; 
R(a)) = Vu(a).
Proof. See proof in Appendix section A.1.1.
1.2.2 Jobs
There exist a continuum of rms that randomly meet workers. After a rm meets a
worker, the rm observes the productivity of the job, , and the ability of the worker, a.
9
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The value of a successful match with a worker of ability a, a job productivity , and a
wage w is:
J(w; a; ) =
a  w
r +  + ee(a; )
: (1.9)
Notice that the expected duration of the job depends on the worker's decision to commit
crimes while employed. If the worker chooses to commit crimes while employed the job
can end with him getting caught and going to prison. If the match is not successful the
worker and rm part ways, in which case the rm receives a payo of zero.
For tractability of the model, I do not explicitly model the matching process. From
the worker perspective, he only cares about the probability of a successful match, that is,
the probability of meeting a rm, j, times the probability that the total job productivity
is above his reservation wage. With the implementation of a binding minimum wage, the
meeting probability remains xed, however the probability that the match is successful
now hinges on whether the total job productivity is above the value of the minimum wage.
Thus as the minimum wage increases, the job nding rate for the worker decreases. The
elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage is important for answering
the question at hand since it determines, in part, the unemployment eect on crime.
The assumption that the meeting probability, j, remains xed with an increase in the
minimum wage is consistent with Flinn (2006) who can not reject that the meeting
probability changes with an increase in the minimum wage from $4.75 to $5.15 in 1997.
Although the meeting probability is xed with respect to the minimum wage, I show in
subsection 1.5.1 that the model matches the empirically estimated employment elasticity
with respect to the minimum wage well.
10
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1.2.3 Wages
As noted by Engelhardt et al. (2008), when the worker can choose to commit crimes
while employed, the feasible set of allocations that split the surplus of the match is non-
convex, therefore the axiomatic approach to bargaining cannot be implemented.8 I choose
to split the surplus through strategic bargaining: the worker and the rm determine the
wage in a two stage game a la Rubinstein's alternating oers.
In the rst stage the rm oers the worker a wage. If he accepts the oer, bargaining
ends and the job begins at the oered wage. If he rejects the wage the game moves to
the second stage where he gets to set the nal wage with probability  and the rm gets
to set the nal wage with probability 1   . The probability that the match breaks up
during negotiations is zero and neither the rm nor the worker discount the future during
the bargaining process.
At this point it is simplest to rewrite the value of employment as a function of the
workers ability and the wage instead of the workers ability and the productivity of the
job; let Ve(w(a; ); a) denote the value of employment for a worker of ability a employed
at a job or productivity  which pays wage w(a; ). There are two wages that are of
particular interest. First, the reservation wage, wR(a)
9, dened as Vu = Ve(wR(a); a)
such that if w  wR(a) the worker chooses to stop searching and accept the job. By the
value of unemployment, (1.6), and the fact that a worker who chooses not to commit
crimes while unemployed, will never commit a crime while employed, Proposition 1, the
reservation wage is
wR(a) =
8<: L+ rVu(a)  e

g + 

z rVu(a)
r+

if Vu(a) < Vu(a)

L+ rVu(a) if Vu(a)  Vu(a):
(1.10)
8The problem is similar to that of on the job search, see Shimer (2006) for details.
9I have suppressed the job productivity value since workers only care about the wage they receive,
not the productivity of the job.
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The second wage of interest is the crime reservation wage, wC(a) dened as g + [Vp  
Ve(wC(a); a)] = 0 such that if w  wC(a) the worker chooses to stop searching, ac-
cept the job, and does not commit crimes while employed.10 Again using the value of
unemployment, (1.6), one can solve for the crime reservation wage:
wC(a) = L+
r(r + )
r + 
Vu(a)
 +
r(   )
r + 
Vu(a) (1.11)
for Vu(a) < Vu(a)
. Workers that do not commit crimes while unemployed do not have a
crime reservation wage since they forgo crime opportunities for all wages.
Equilibrium wages can be found by solving the two stage game through backwards
induction, rst solving the optimal wage oers in the second stage for the worker and
the rm, then solving for the rm's optimal oer in the rst stage given the second stage
outcomes. In the rst stage the rm oers the prot maximizing wage subject to the
worker accepting the oer. Therefore, in equilibrium wages will be determined without
delay.
In the second stage, if a worker of ability a gets to set the nal wage he will choose to
set the wage equal to the total productivity of the match, w = a, thus taking the entire
surplus of the match. If the worker is a criminal, then he continues to commit crimes
while employed if a < wC(a) and forges crime if a  wC(a). If the rm matches with a
criminal and gets to set the nal wage in the second stage, the rm must choose between
setting the wage at the reservation wage or setting the wage at the crime reservation
wage. So for Vu(a) < Vu(a)
, the rm faces the following problem in the second stage:
w(a; ) = argmax
fwR;wCg

a  wR(a)
r +  + e
;
a  wC(a)
r + 

(1.12)
It is easy to show that wR(a) < wC(a), therefore the rm faces a trade o between
receiving a higher ow value for the job for a shorter expected duration, or a lower ow
10I will assumed that workers are moral, such that a worker that is indierent to committing crimes
will chose not to commit crimes.
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value for the job for a longer expected duration. Problem (1.12) has a unique solution
for the job productivity that equates the two choices, call it D2(a):
D2(a) =
(r +  + e)wC(a)  (r + )wR(a)
ae
: (1.13)
If  < D2(a) the rm sets the wage wR(a) and if   D2(a) then the rm sets the wage
wC(a) in the second stage. If the rm matches with a non-criminal, Vu(a)  Vu(a), then
it has no choice to make and it sets the wage to the workers reservation wage, wR(a).
In the rst stage the rm chooses to oer the wage that maximizes prots subject to
the worker accepting the oer. The worker will accept the oer if it is at least as large
as his expected value of the second stage. For non-criminals, the expected value of the
second stage is:
Ve(a; a) + (1  )Ve(wR(a); a) = Ve(a+ (1  )wR(a); a) (1.14)
since the value of employment for non-criminals is linear in the wage. For non-criminals
the rm must oer a wage at least as large as the expected wage in the second stage, so
the rm faces the following problem in the rst stage:
w(a; ) = argmax
w
a  w
r + 
s.t. w  a+ (1  )wR(a): (1.15)
Therefore, the rm oers wage w(a; ) = a+(1 )wR(a) whenever Vu(a)  Vu(a) and
the worker accepts the oer. Since matches are heterogeneous in their productivity, not
all matches lead to a lled job. When a worker matches with a rm the productivity must
be high enough for him to give up his value of continued search and enter employment.
The worker will choose employment whenever w(; a)  wR(a), so his reservation match
value is R(a) = wR(a)=a.
If the rm matches with a criminal, the problem it faces in the rst stage depends
on the productivity of the job. It is easy to show that aD2(a) > wC(a) for all a
, so if
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the match productivity is greater than D2(a) the wage in either outcome of the second
stage will be high enough to deter the worker from crime. Again the rm must oer at
least the expected wage of the second stage, so the rm's problem in the rst stage is:
Ve(a; a) + (1  )Ve(wC(a); a) = Ve(a+ (1  )wC(a); a) (1.16)
since the value of employment is linear in the wage if the worker does not commit crimes
in either state of the second stage. If  > 0 then the expected value of the second stage
is greater than or equal to wC(a), implying that if the rm deters a worker from crime in
the second stage it will also deter him in the rst stage. Therefore the rm's rst stage
problem is:
w(a; ) = argmax
w
a  w
r + 
s.t. w  a+ (1  )wC(a): (1.17)
Again the rm oers the worker the expected wage of the second stage w(a; ) = a+
(1 )wC(a), and the worker accepts the job and does not commit crimes while employed.
If the total match productivity is below the crime reservation wage, a < wC(a) then
in either outcome of the second stage the wage is not high enough to deter the worker
from committing crimes while employed. In this case the expected value of the second
stage for the worker is:
Ve(a; a) + (1  )Ve(wR(a); a) = Ve(a+ (1  )wR(a); a) (1.18)
since the value of employment is linear in the wage if the worker commits crimes in either
state in the second stage. Therefore the rm must oer at least the expected wage of
the second stage for the worker to accept the oer. Since the total productivity of the
match is less than the crime reservation wage in this case, the rm will never deter the
worker from crime. Therefore the problem the rm faces for such match values is:
w(a; ) = argmax
w
a  w
r + 
s.t. w  a+ (1  )wR(a): (1.19)
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and the rm oers the worker the expected wage of the second stage, w(a; ) = a +
(1  )wR(a) and the worker accepts the job and commits crimes while employed.
If the total match productivity is above the crime reservation wage but below the
productivity needed for the rm to deter the worker from crime in the second stage,
wC(a) < a < a
D2(a), the expected value of the second stage for the worker is:
Ve(a; a) + (1  )Ve(wR(a); a)
= 

a  L+ Vu(a)
r + 

+ (1  )

wR(a)  L+ Vu(a) + e(g + Vp(a))
r +  + e

(1.20)
Since the worker will commit crimes if the rm makes the oer in the second stage but
forgo crime opportunities if he gets to set the wage in the second stage. The constraint
the rm faces in the second stage is to oer a wage such that the value of employment is
at least as large as the expected value of the second stage:
Ve(w; a)  

a  L+ Vu(a)
r + 

+ (1  )

wR(a)  L+ Vu(a) + e(g + Vp(a))
r +  + e

(1.21)
First, one can show that if (r + )=e  (1   )= then all match productivities for
which wC(a) < a < a
D2(a), the wage which makes the worker indierent between
accepting the rst round oer and moving to the second stage is not high enough to
deter the worker from crime. Therefore Equation 1.21 simplies to
w  (r +  + e)[a  (L+ rVu(a))]
r + 
+ wR(a) (1.22)
In this case the rm has a choice to make in the rst stage: oer a wage at least as
large as the wage constraint in Equation 1.22 for which the worker will commit crimes
on the job or raise the wage to the crime reservation wage, wC(a), to deter the worker
from crime. The rm's rst stage problem is:
w(a; ) = argmax
w
(
argmax
w
a  w
r + 
s.t. wwC(a)
; argmax
w
a  w
r +  + e
s.t. wC(a)>w & Equation 1:22
)
: (1.23)
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As before, the rm faces the trade o between a higher ow value for a shorter duration
or a lower ow value for a longer duration. There exists a productivity, D1(a), such
that if  < D1(a) the rm will oer the wage which makes Equation 1.22 bind and
the worker will accept the job, at which he continues to commit crimes. If   D1(a)
the rm will oer the crime reservation wage and the worker will accept the oer, since
the value of employment at the crime reservation wage is above the expected value of
the second stage. While employed at wC(a), the worker will not commit crimes. The
productivity above which rms deter workers from crime in the rst stage is
D1(a) =
(r +  + e)[wC(a) + (L+ rVu(a))]  (r + )wR(a)
a(e + (r +  + e))
: (1.24)
The full wage prole for criminals in this case is:
w(a; ) =
8>><>>:
a+ (1  )wR(a) if R(a)   < wC(a)=a
(r++e)[a (L+rVu(a))]
r+
+ wR(a) if wC(a)=a   < D1(a)
wC(a) if 
D1(a)   < D2(a)
a+ (1  )wC(a) if   D2(a):
(1.25)
Figure 1.2 shows the wage prole for a worker of type Vu(a) < Vu(a)
. The worker gets
the expected wage of the second stage for all matches with productivity R(a)   <
wC(a)=a, the wage that makes constraint Equation 1.22 bind for all match productivi-
ties wC(a)=a   < D1(a), the crime reservation wage for matches with productivity
D1(a)   < D2(a) and the expected wage of the second stage for matches with pro-
ductivity   D2(a). Proposition 2 gives a summary of the worker's employment and
crime decisions for all match values.
Proposition 2. If (r + )=e  (1  )= then,
a. If u(a) = 0 then for all   R(a) the worker accepts the job and e(a; w(a; )) = 0.
b. If u(a) = 1 then for all 
R(a)    D1(a) the worker accepts the job and
e(a; w(a; )) = 1.
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Figure 1.2: Wage Prole for Workers with Vu(a) < Vu(a)

w
a
wC(a)
w(a; )
aD2(a)aR(a)
wR(a)
aD1(a)
45
c. If u(a) = 1 then for all   D1(a) the worker accepts the job and e(a; w(a; )) =
0.
Proof. See proof in Appendix section A.1.1.
Figure 1.3 gives a graphical representation of Proposition 2; note the gure plots total
match productivity on the y-axis. The slopes of the deterrence match values, D1(a) and
D2(a), depend on parameter values and can be either negative or positive, however
since the worker's reservation wage is always less than his crime reservation wage one can
show that D1(a) < D2(a). The gure shows the case where both D1(a) and D2(a)
are decreasing in ability.
Notice that both wage proles are fully characterized by the match productivity
and the workers values of unemployment Vu(a) through the reservation wage and crime
17
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Figure 1.3: Reservation match values and decision rules
a
a
aR(a)
aD2(a)
aD1(a)
a
Crime and Unemployed
Crime and Employed
No Crime and Unemployed
w = wc(a)
No Crime and Employed
reservation wage. For criminals, Vu(a) < Vu(a)
, the value of unemployment is
rVu(a) = ab L+ uu[Ku(a)  Vu(a)]
+j
 Z wC(a)=a
R(a)
Ve(a+ (1  )wR(a); a)  Vu(a) dG()
+
Z D1(a)
wC(a)=a
Ve

(r +  + e)[a  (L+ rVu(a))]
r + 
+ wR(a); a

  Vu(a) dG()
+
Z D2(a)
D1(a)
Ve(wC(a); a)  Vu(a) dG() (1.26)
+
Z
D2(a)
Ve(a+ (1  )wC(a); a) dG()

:
Equation 1.26 recursively denes Vu(a) for each a, given the equations for the reservation
match values, R(a) = wR(a)=a, Equation 1.24 for 
D1(a), and Equation 1.13 for D2(a),
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as well as the equations for the reservation wage, Equation 1.10, the crime reservation
wage, Equation 1.11, and the value of employment, Equation 1.6.
1.3 Steady State
To solve for the steady-state distribution of workers across states. First dene for
workers with ability a the measure u(a), unemployed; ec(a), employed and committing
crimes; enc(a), employed and not committing crimes; and p(a), in prison. A worker with
a < a is a potential criminal and can ow between all four states, and a worker with
a  a will never commit a crime and can only ow between u(a) and enc(a).
For a potential criminal the ow from unemployment to employment and crime is
equal to the probability that he receives a job oer times the probability that the pro-
ductivity of the job is above his reservation match value and below the productivity at
which a rm will deter him from crime:
j

G
 
D1(a)
 G R(a)  jD(a): (1.27)
The ow from unemployment to employment and not committing crimes is equal to the
probability that the worker receives a job oer, times the probability that the productivity
of the job is above the value at which a rm will deter him from crime:
j

1 G D1(a)  jA(b): (1.28)
For a non-criminal, the ow from unemployment to employment is equal to the proba-
bility that he receives a job oer, times the probability that the productivity of the job
is above his reservation match value:
j

1 G R(a)  jB(a): (1.29)
Figure 1.4 shows the labor market ows for both types of workers.
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Figure 1.4: Labor Market Flows
p(a)
ec(a) enc(a)
u(a)
jD(a)

u

e jA(a)
(a) Flows for a < a
enc(a)
u(a)
 jB(a)
(b) Flows for a > a
A steady state is a set of measures fu(a); ec(a); enc(a); p(a)g for all a such that the
ows between states are equal. The solution to the steady state measures can be found in
appendix section A.1.2. The aggregate measure of unemployed criminals and aggregate
measure of unemployed non-criminals are:
uc =
Z a
u(a) dF (a) (1.30)
unc =
Z
a
u(a) dF (a): (1.31)
The aggregate measure of workers employed and committing crimes and the aggregate
measure of workers employed and not committing crimes are:
ec =
Z a
ec(a) dF (a) (1.32)
enc =
Z
enc(a) dF (a): (1.33)
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The aggregate measure of workers in prison is:
p =
Z a
p(a) dF (a): (1.34)
The steady state unemployment rate is:
U =
Z
u(a)
1  p(a) dF (a) (1.35)
and the crime rate is:
C =
Z a uu(a) + eec(a)
1  p(a) dF (a): (1.36)
Here I have use the non-institutionalized population as the denominator for the aggregate
unemployment rate and the aggregate crime rate.
1.4 A Binding Minimum Wage
The minimum wage will change the interactions between the rm and the worker by
acting as a constraint that each must consider when making a wage oer. I will assume
the minimum wage, m, is set exogenously by the government and that all matches are
subject to this constraint. Since wages are the only transfer from the rm to the worker,
the rm cannot alter any other forms of compensation to undo the eect of the minimum
wage. A minimum wage is binding if it alters the outcome of the bargaining problem for
at least one type of worker and at least one job productivity. The question of interest
is then: how does the minimum wage change wages and in turn a worker's decision to
commit crimes?
1.4.1 Wages
The minimum wage enters the bargaining problem as a constraint; rms and workers
can never oer a wage below m in the rst stage or the second stage of the bargaining
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process. Under the constrained game, there exists a new value of unemployment for the
worker that will depend on the minimum wage, I denote this value as Vu(a;m). First,
the lowest wage payed to a worker of ability a is aR(a;m), thus any minimum wage for
which there exists an a such that m > aR(a;m) = wR(a) is binding. An immediate
implication of a binding minimum wage is that matches with total productivity less than
m are no longer feasible.
Starting with the simplest case, if the minimum wage is binding for a non-criminal
the rm must oer at least m in the second stage. The expected wage of the second
stage for the worker becomes a + (1   )m. In the rst stage the rm oers a wage
that maximizes prots subject to the worker accepting the oer. As before, it oers
the expected wage of the second stage and since m > aR(a;m), wages increase for all
productivities.
For a potential criminal, the solution to the constrained bargaining problem depends
on whether or not the minimum wage is larger than the crime reservation wage. If
m < wC(a) then only jobs with productivities at which the rm does not deter the
worker in the second stage are constrained. Figure 1.5a shows the constrained second
stage. Since the minimum wage is less than the worker's crime reservation wage the rm
must choose whether or not to deter the worker from crime in the second stage. The rm
faces the following problem in the second stage:
w(a; ) = argmax
fm;wCg

a m
r +  + e
;
a  wC(a)
r + 

: (1.37)
As with the unconstrained problem, for low productivity jobs, the rm will choose to
pay the minimum wage and have a shorter job duration. The match value that makes
the rm indierent between deterring and not deterring the worker in the second stage
is now,
D2(a;m) =
(r +  + e)wC(a)  (r + )m
ae
(1.38)
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Figure 1.5: Constrained Second Stage
Worker: w = a

Firm:
1  
crime
a < wC
no crimea  wC
w = wC ! no crime  
D2(m)
w = maxfm;wRg ! crime
 < D2(m)
(a) For a worker of ability a with m < wC(a)
Worker: w = a

Firm: w = maxfm;wCg ! no crime
1  
crime
a < wC
no crimea  wC
(b) For a worker of ability a with m  wC(a)
above which the rm will choose to oer the crime reservation wage and receive a lower
ow value for a longer duration. In the case that the total match productivity less than
the crime reservation wage, wC(a), a binding minimum wage implies that the expected
value of the second stage is now,
Ve(a; a) + (1  )Ve(m; a) = Ve(a+ (1  )m; a) (1.39)
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since the worker will commit crimes in both possible outcomes of the second stage,
the value of employment is linear in the wage. If the total match productivity of the
job is less than the crime reservation wage, the rm will not deter the worker from
crime in the rst stage, so it oers the worker the expected wage of the second stage,
w(; a) = a+ (1  )m.
If the total match productivity is greater than the crime reservation wage but not
high enough for the rm to deter in the second stage, wC(a) < a < a
D2(a), then the
workers expected value of the second stage is:
Ve(w; a)  

a  L+ Vu(a)
r + 

+(1 )

m  L+ Vu(a) + e(g + Vp(a))
r +  + e

(1.40)
which simplies to the follow constraint on the wage:
w  (r +  + e)[a  (L+ rVu(a))]
(r + )
+ wR(a) + (1  )(m  wR(a)): (1.41)
Again the rm can choose to deter the worker from crime in the rst stage by oering
at lease the crime reservation wage or it can oer the worker the expected value of the
second stage, in which case it receives a higher ow value for a shorter duration. The
rms problem in the rst stage is:
w(a; ) = argmax
w
(
argmax
w
a  w
r + 
s.t. wwC(a)
; argmax
w
a  w
r +  + e
s.t. wC(a)>w & Equation 1:41
)
: (1.42)
The solution is similar to the unconstrained problem: the rm gives the worker the
expected value of the second stage by paying the wage that makes Equation 1.41 bind,
for low productivities and there exits some productivity, D1(a;m), above which the rm
deters the worker from crime by oering the crime reservation wage.
D1(a;m) =
(r +  + e)[wC(a) + (L+ rVu(a))]  (r + )[wR(a) + (1  )(m  wR(a))]
a(e + (r +  + e))
(1.43)
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Figure 1.6 shows the wage prole with the minimum wage imposed. The new wage oered
by the rm is
~w(a; ;m) =
8>><>>:
a+ (1  )m if m   < wC(a)
(r++e)[a (L+rVu(a))]
(r+)
+ wR(a) + (1  )(m  wR(a)) if wC(a)   < D1(a;m)
wC(a) if 
D1(a;m)   < D2(a;m)
a+ (1  )wC(a) if   D2(a;m):
(1.44)
Figure 1.6 shows that a binding minimum wage compresses the wage distribution for
a worker up to D2(a). Proposition 3 summarizes the eects on the wage distribution.
Part a.i. implies that a rm will deter the worker from crime for a larger range of
productivities. With the minimum wage, the ow value of a lled job decreases since
the expected value of the second stage increases. A reduction in the ow value of the
job reduces the benet to the rm from oering a wage lower than the worker's crime
reservation wage, and therefore the rm will choose to deter the worker from crime for
more job productivities.
Proposition 3.
a. If (r + )=e  (1  )= and m < wC(a) then
i. @
D1(a;m)
@m
< 0
i. @
D2(a;m)
@m
< 0
iii. ~w(a; ;m)  w(a; ) for all m   < D2(a;m)
b. If m  wC(a) then ~w(a; ;m) > w(a; ) for all matches values that lead to a lled
job.
If the minimum wage is above the crime reservation wage the rm has no decision
to make in the second stage since all wages it can oer will deter the worker from crime
while employed. Figure 1.5b shows the constrained second stage for which the expected
wage is now a + (1   )m for all feasible matches. Since the worker will forge crime
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Figure 1.6: Wage Prole for Constrained Workers with Vu(a) < Vu(a)

w
a
wC(a)
aD2aR
wR(a)
aD1
45
m
~w(a; ;m)
aD2(m)m aD1(m)
opportunities in either state, the expected value for the worker of the second stage is
liner and so the rm must oer at least the expected wage of the second stage. If there
is some positive probability that the worker gets to set the wage in the second stage,
then the expected wage of the second stage is strictly greater than the crime reservation
wage. Therefore, the rm does not need to decide whether or not to deter the worker
from crime in the rst stage and faces the following problem in the rst stage:
w(a; ) = argmax
w
  w
r + 
s.t. w  + (1  )m: (1.45)
The rm maximizes prots by oering the expected wage of the second stage which the
worker will accept and forgo crimes while employed. The wage is simply ~w(a; ;m) =
a + (1   )m for all   m. Part b. of Proposition 3 summarizes the eect of a
minimum wage in this case and Figure 1.7 shows the eect on the worker's wage prole,
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which increases for all feasible matches.
Figure 1.7: Constrained Wage Prole for workers with Vu(a) < Vu(a)
 when m  wC(a)
w
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45
m
~w(a; ;m)
1.4.2 Workers
Since meeting rates are exogenous the minimum wage will have no eect on the rate
at which a worker meets with a rm. However, the minimum wage will change the range
of productivities at which a worker will choose to commit crimes and therefore the rate
at which he ows into and out of a criminal state. A potential criminal will commit
crimes for all matches with productivity less than D1(a;m); if the productivity is less
than maxfm=a; R(a;m)g he will commit crimes at rate u because he is unemployed
and if the productivity is greater than maxfm=a; R(a;m)g but less than D1(a;m) he
will commit crimes at rate e because the wage oered by such a job is not high enough
to deter him from crime.
A binding minimum wage will have three eects on a worker's propensity to commit
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crimes: a wage eect, an unemployment eect, and an indirect eect. The wage eect
occurs when workers are deterred from committing crimes due to receiving a higher
wage. The unemployment eect occurs when either: (1) a worker is displaced from jobs
at which he would not have committed crimes or (2) the rate at which he receives crime
opportunities diers across states and he is displaced from any job. The indirect eect
is driven by changes in the unemployment value, Vu(a;m). A change in the minimum
wage will aect a worker's value of unemployment and therefore indirectly aect the ows
between criminal and non-criminal states.
Wage Eect
Since all workers aected by the minimum wage experience an increase in wages for
a range of productivities, the wage eect exists for all workers with a reservation wage
less than the minimum wage. In Figure 1.8a this is all workers with ability less than a1.
For a worker with ability less than a2 in Figure 1.8a, the minimum wage is higher than
his crime reservation wage, and he will never commit crimes while employed. Therefore,
he ows out of a criminal state if he receive a job oer with productivity greater than or
equal to m=a.
For a worker with ability greater than a2 but less than a1 in Figure 1.8a, the crime
reservation wage is above the minimum wage and he will continue to commit crimes
while employed at some jobs. However, the range of productivities for which he commits
crimes has decreased (part a.i. of Proposition 3.) as shown by the fact that D1(a) is
greater than D1(a;m) in Figure 1.8a. All together, the blue shaded region of Figure
1.8a shows the matches that no longer lead to crime while employed due to an increase
in wages. In Figure 1.8b the minimum wage is above all workers' crime reservation wage
and therefore all workers forgo crime while employed. Again, the wage eect corresponds
to the blue shaded region; these are matches at which a worker would have committed
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crimes before the minimum wage.
Figure 1.8: Minimum Wage Eects on Matches
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Unemployment Eect
There are two channels through which a worker will change the amount of crimes
he commits due to unemployment. First, if the rate at which he receive crime oppor-
tunities diers across states. Specically, if he receives more crime opportunities while
unemployed, e < u, then when he is displaced from a job, he will commit more crimes.
In Figure 1.8a, this corresponds to the red shaded region; these are productivities at
which workers would have accepted a job and committed less crime in the absence of the
minimum wage.
Second, if a worker is displaced from a job at which he would not have committed
a crime, then the minimum wage will increase the amount of crimes he commits. This
occurs when the minimum wage is above the productivity at which the rm would have
chosen to deterred the worker from crime. This corresponds to matches with a total
productivity greater than aD1(a) and less than m in Figure 1.8a. Only workers with
ability greater than a3 and less than a
 are displaced from jobs at which they would
not have committed crimes. The red shaded region of Figures 1.8a and 1.8b show the
matches that lead to an increase in crime through both channels.
Indirect Eect
The indirect eect of the minimum wage on a worker's crime decisions is driven by
changes in his value of unemployment. Take, for example, a worker with ability greater
than a2 and less than a1. From Figure 1.8a it is clear that his value of unemployment has
changed for two reasons: (1) some matches are no longer feasible and (2) some matches
experience a wage increase. The fact that some matches no longer lead to lled jobs
decreases his value of unemployment. On the other hand, the wage increase for some
matches increases his value of unemployment. Therefore, the overall eect of a minimum
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wage on the worker's value of unemployment is ambiguous, depends on the size of the
minimum wage, and varies across workers.
1.4.3 Equilibrium Crime Rate
The equilibrium crime rate given in equation (1.36) depends on the steady state mea-
sures, u(a), ec(a), and p(a), and the rates at which workers receive crime opportunities
while employed, e, and unemployed, u. When the minimum wage changes, the aggre-
gate crime rate is aected by changes in workers' decisions to commit crimes and accept
jobs. From Figure 1.8a it is clear that workers are aected dierentially by the minimum
wage; some workers are deterred from crime for more job productivities and are displaced
from more jobs. Therefore, analytical results for a change in the crime rate depend on the
distribution of ability, the distribution of job productivities and the size of the minimum
wage.
1.5 Calibration
The unit of time is one month and the rate of time preference is r = 0:0101. The model
is calibrated to match the crime and labor market in 1998. The model is normalized by
setting the ow utility of prison, z, equal to zero.11 The probability a worker gets to set
the wage in the second stage, , acts as the worker's bargaining power, which is set to
 = 0:4 as estimated by Flinn (2006).
The crimes considered are Type 1 property crimes dened by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) as larceny, burglary and motor vehicle theft. The probability of
being caught is derived from the clearance rate and the incarceration rate of these crimes
11Since individuals can not choose how long to say in prison, these does not exist an empirical moment
that could pin down the ow utility of prison.
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as reported by the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). The UCR denes the clearance
rate as the ratio of arrests to crimes reported and the incarceration rate as the ratio of
convictions to arrests. In 1998 the clearance rate for property crimes was 17:5% and the
incarceration rate for property crimes was 65%, implying the probability a worker goes
to prison is  = 0:175  0:65 = 0:114. The prison release rate is calibrated to target
the average time in prison for property crimes as reported by the National Corrections
Reporting Program. In 1998, the average time in prison for property crimes was 20
months implying  = 1=20 = 0:05. The UCR reports that the average loss per property
crime in 1998 was $1; 407 implying the gain from crime is g = $1; 407. The expected loss,
L, is set such that the crime market is in equilibrium, that is, the expected loss is the
gain from crime times the crime rate, which is calculated below.
The remaining set of parameters (b, e; u; j; ; ; a; a, ), where  and  are
the mean and standard deviation of the job productivity distribution and a and a are
the mean and standard deviation of the ability distribution, are calibrated to match a
set of empirical moments derived from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997
(NLSY97). The data are collected from 8,984 respondents who were ages 12-17 when
rst interviewed in 1997. Respondents were asked questions about their labor market
status including employment status, wages, and hours worked. The survey also asks
individuals to report the crimes they committed during the year, specically useful for
the question posed here are individuals' responses to the number of times they stole
more than $50 worth and the number of times they committed other property crimes
such as fencing, receiving, possessing or selling stolen property. In the rst round of
the survey, respondents were administered the computer-adaptive form of the Armed
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (CAT-ASVAB).12
12The CAT-ASVAB measures an individual's knowledge in the following areas:Arithmetic Reasoning,
Electronics Information, Numerical Operations, Assembling Objects, General Science, Paragraph Com-
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Nine empirical moments are constructed using the NLSY97 data for 1998, to target
the remaining parameters. The moments constructed are: the monthly crime rate, the
ratio of the crime rate among the unemployed to employed, the monthly unemployment
rate, the monthly job nding probability, the monthly separation rate, the 10th percentile
to median and median to 90th percentile ratios of the CAT-ASVAB scores, the minimum
wage to median wage ratio, and the median to 75th percentile wage ratio. Details of how
these moments are constructed can be found appendix section A.1.4. Table 1.1 gives a
summary of the empirical moments.
Table 1.1: Summary of Empirical Moments
Moment Value
Unemployment rate 0.124
Crime rate 0.042
Crime rate of Unemp. / Crime rate of Emp. 1.159
Job nding rate 0.160
Seperation rate 0.011
10th Percentile / 50th Percentile exp(CAT-ASVAB) 0.312
50th Percentile / 90th Percentile exp(CAT-ASVAB) 0.454
Minimum Wage / 50th Percentile Wage 0.880
50th Percentile / 75th Percentile Wage 0.900
Since jobs separate at an exogenous rate in the model,  = 0:011 to match the
monthly separation rate in the NLSY97. The two moments derived from the CAT-
ASVAB scores are used to calibrate a distribution of abilities. The CAT-ASVAB scores
have a normal distribution in the data; however, since ability multiplicatively enters
into the total productivity of a job, a negative ability level would imply never nding a
productive job. Therefore, the CAT-ASVAB scores are exponentiated, giving ability a
log-normal distribution. Further, since the lower bound of a log-normal distribution is
prehension, Auto Information, Mathematics Knowledge, Shop Information, Coding Speed, Mechanical
Comprehension, Word Knowledge.
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zero, one is added to the exponentiated test scores, again insuring that all individuals
have a non-zero probability of nding a productive match. These assumptions lead to
a distribution of abilities, a   1  lnN(a; a), where a and a are chosen to match
the ratio of the 10th/50th percentile and the 50th/90th percentile of the exponentiated
CAT-ASVAB scores. Matching the ratios of test scores assumes test scores ordinally
identify ability.
The remaining six parameters, (b, e, u,j,, ), are calibrated to match the
remaining six moments jointly using simulated method of moments. Although all six
parameters inuence all six moments, intuitively the job productivity parameters, 
and , are chosen to target the ratios of the wage distribution. The distribution for
job productivities is log normal,   lnN(; ). The crime arrival rates u and e are
chosen to target the aggregate crime rate and relative crime rate of the unemployed to
employed. The job contact rate, j, is chosen to target the job nding rate and the ow
value of unemployment b is chosen to target the unemployment rate.
The average weekly hours worked in the NLSY97 for 1998 was 21.7 and the minimum
wage in 1998 wage $5.15 implying a monthly minimum wage of m = 5:15  21:7  4 =
446:06. The monthly crime rate in 1998 measured from the NLSY97 was 0:042 and the
gain from crime was $1; 407 so the expected loss from crime is L = $58:47. Table 1.2
and Table 1.3 summarize all parameters and Table 1.4 gives the empirical and model
generated moments.
The estimated crime arrival rates are 0:24 while employed and 0:05 while unemployed,
implying a monthly probability of nding a crime opportunity of 0:21 while employed
and 0:05 while unemployed. The job oer rate is 4:2, implying a monthly probability of
receiving a job oer of 0:98. The calibrated mean and variance of the job productivity
distribution and the ability distribution imply a mean total job productivity, a, of
$341:31 and a standard deviation of $346:14.
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Table 1.2: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description
r 0:0101 real interest rate
 0:4 bargaining power of workers
L $58:47 expected loss from crime
z 0 prison utility
 0:05 prison release rate
 0:114 probability of getting caught
m $446:06 minimum wage job
g $1; 407 gain from crime
Table 1.3: Simulated Method of Moments Estimates
Parameter Estimate p5 p95 Description
 0:011 0:001 0:013 separation rate
b  26:70  31:6930  25:0907 ow utility of unemployment
e 0.2391 0:1835 0:3074 arrival rate of crime opp. while emp.
u 0.0468 0:0213 0:0581 arrival rate of crime opp. while unemp.
j 4.1692 3:5595 5:0588 arrival rate of jobs opportunities
 0.8623 0.6947 0.9578 mean of productivity distribution
 0.5291 0.4939 0.5809 s.d. of productivity distribution
a 4.6256 4.5545 4.7296 mean ability
a 0:6293 0.5945 0.6738 s.d. of ability
Note: The columns labeled p5 and p95 give the 5th and 95th percentile of estimates from 500 boot-
strapped samples.
1.5.1 Model Generated Elasticities
Since the eect of the minimum wage on the crime rate is driven through changes
in the labor market, I test the model in two dimensions: the response of workers' crime
decisions with respect to changes in the labor market and changes in the labor market
with respect to changes in the minimum wage. Specically, two data sets are generated
through simulation of the model, similar to those used by empirical researchers, and
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Table 1.4: Moments Matched
Moment Empirical Model
Unemployment rate 0.124 0.124
Crime rate 0.042 0.041
Crime rate of Unemp. / Crime rate of Emp. 1.159 1.159
Job nding rate 0.160 0.159
10th Percentile / 50th Percentile exp(CAT-ASVAB) 0.312 0.312
50th Percentile / 90th Percentile exp(CAT-ASVAB) 0.454 0.454
Minimum Wage / 50th Percentile Wage 0.880 0.883
50th Percentile / 75th Percentile Wage 0.900 0.899
used to estimate the elasticity of crime with respect to unemployment and wages and the
elasticity of employment and earnings with respect to the minimum wage. I compare the
estimated elasticities that the calibrated model delivers to those found in the empirical
literature to validate the relationship between the labor market and criminal propensity
and the minimum wage and the labor market. Both data sets are generated based on
variation in the real minimum wage observed across states from 1990 to 2011. Table
1.5 summaries the variation in the minimum wage across the sample; the real binding
minimum wage is the maximum of the state and federal minimum wage in 1998 dollars.
Table 1.5: Minimum Wage Summary Statistics
Mean St. dev. Min Max
Federal Min. Wage 5.24 0.99 3.80 7.25
State Min. Wage 5.30 1.31 1.6 8.67
Binding Min. Wage 5.46 1.15 3.80 8.67
Real Binding Min. Wage 5.09 0.55 4.34 6.83
The rst data generated is a panel of 1,000 individuals for every realization of the
real binding minimum wage; this gives a total sample size of 204,000. For each individual
the probability of unemployment and employment, probability of committing a crime,
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and expected wage are simulated using the calibrated parameters. Full details of the
simulations can be found in appendix section A.1.5. Using the simulated unemployment
probability and simulated expected wage, expected monthly earnings are calculated as
the employment probability times the expected wage. Panel A of Table 1.6 gives the
summary statistics for the generated sample.
The generated sample is used to estimate the elasticity of workers' crime decisions with
respect to unemployment and wages and the model generated elasticities are compared
to those found in the empirical literature. The model generated elasticities are estimated
by the following regressions:
(1) ln crimei;m = 0 + 1Um + "i;m
(2) ln crimei;m = 0 + 1 lnEarningsi;m + "i;m
where ln crimei;m is the natural log of the simulated probability of committing a crime
for worker i for minimum wage m, Um is the unemployment probability for minimum
wage m, lnEarningsi;m is the natural log of earnings for worker i at minimum wage m
and "i;m is statistical noise generated in the simulation through the random draw of a
crime opportunity and job productivity. Panel B of Table 1.6 gives the regression results.
Several empirical studies have estimated the elasticity of crime with respect to unem-
ployment and wages and nd a semi-elasticity of crime with respect to unemployment,
^1, of 1.2 to 2, and an elasticity of crime with respect to earnings, ^1, of -0.5 to -2 (Gould
et al., 2002; Mocan and Unel, 2011; Schnepel, 2014). The model generated elasticity of
crime with respect to earnings,  0:29, is on the low side of the empirically estimated
range. The model generates an elasticity of crime with respect to unemployment, 2:15,
that is slightly higher than the empirically estimated elasticities.
To estimate the response of the labor market to changes in the minimum wage within
the model, a cross section of aggregate employment probabilities, and expected wages
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Table 1.6: Simulated Individual Analysis
Panel A: Simulated Data Summary Statistics
Mean St. dev. Min Max
Crime 0.036 0.034 0 0.154
Wage 609.51 213.95 394.71 2424.40
Earnings 532.31 267.01 0 2385.61
Unemployment 0.143 0.240 0 1
Panel B: Regression Results
ln Crime ln Crime
(1) (2)
Unemployment 2:15
ln (Earnings)  0:29
N 204,000 204,000
Note: Observations for which crime or earnings equal 0 were replace with 0.0001
before taking logs.
for every unique realization of the real binding minimum wage within the sample is
generated. The generated data has a sample size of 1,122. Full details of the simulations
can be found in appendix section A.1.5. Aggregate monthly earnings are constructed by
multiplying the unemployment rate by wages. Using the aggregate sample, the model's
generated elasticities are estimated by the following regressions:
(1) lnEmpm = 0 + 1 lnMinWagem + "m
(2) lnEarningsm =  0 +  1 lnMinWagem + "m
where lnEmpm is the natural log of the average employment probability for minimum
wagem, lnEarningsm is the natural log of average earnings for minimum wagem, and "m
is statistical noise generated from the random draws from the productivity distribution.
Panel A of Table 1.7 gives summary statistics for the aggregate data and Panel B of
Table 1.7 gives the regression results.
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Table 1.7: Simulated Aggregates Analysis
Panel A: Simulated Data Summary Statistics
Mean St. dev. Min Max
Unemployment 0.127 0.026 0.072 0.221
Employment 0.873 0.026 0.779 0.927
Wage 598.57 36.78 534.19 722.86
Earnings 524.35 19.71 469.12 594.73
Panel B: Regression Results
Dependent Variable
lnEmp lnWage
ln MinWage  0:264 0:299
N 1,122 1,122
The literature on employment eects of the minimum wage is lengthy and mixed,
see Neumark and Wascher (2007) for a review. Dube et al. (2010) study employment
eects on restaurant workers and nd no signicant eect. The employment eects
from the minimum wage on teen employment is mixed as well; Allegretto et al. (2010)
nding no signicant employment eects and Neumark et al. (2014) nding signicant
employment eects on teens with estimated elasticities around  0:3. The estimated
elasticity of employment with respect to the minimum wage within the calibrated model
 0:264, lower than the upper bound of the empirical literature. However, recent work
from Jardim et al. (2017) suggests that the elasticity of employment with respect to
the minimum wage may be much higher than previously estimated. The empirically
estimated elasticity of wages with respect to the minimum wage is between 0.15 and 0.22
(Dube et al., 2010; Allegretto et al., 2010). The model delivers an estimated elasticity of
0:3, slightly higher than the empirical literature.
Overall, the calibrated model generates elasticities similar to those estimated in the
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empirical literature; changes in labor market conditions within the calibrated model aect
individual's crime decisions similarly to what can be observed in data. Furthermore, the
eect of minimum wages on aggregate labor market conditions within the calibrated
model are comparable to those estimated in the empirical literature. Since the calibrated
model does not match these elasticities I argue that these results establish a degree of
external validity for the calibrated model.
1.6 Increasing the Minimum Wage
Using the calibrated parameters, I solve the model for minimum wages between $5
and $15. For this exercise, the probability of being victimized, , is endogenized such that
it is equal to the crime rate in steady state. Figure 1.9 shows the change in the aggregate
crime rate, equation (1.36), over the range of minimum wages. The gure shows that
the aggregate crime rate decreases with minimum wages between $5 and $7.50, implying
that the wage eect outweighs the unemployment eect over this range. With minimum
wages above $7.50, the crime rate begins to increase as the unemployment eect begins
to dominate. Figure 1.9 also plots the crime rate with respect to the minimum to median
wage ratio. Since increases in the minimum wage aect the entire wage distribution,
observing how the crime rate changes with respect to the minimum to median wage
ratio is more informative for optimal policy. The model reveals that the crime rate is
minimized when the minimum wage is 0.91 of the median wage of 16 to 19 year olds.
The fact that the aggregate crime rate responds more to changes in wages than
to changes in unemployment for relatively small increases in the minimum wage stems
from the fact that employment decreases only marginally. This nding is similar to
Imrohoroglu et al. (2004) who nd that rising average incomes from 1980 to 1996 alone
could account for 20% of the decrease in crime observed over the period, whereas the small
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Figure 1.9: Crime Rate
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increases in youth unemployment over the same period had no eect on the aggregate
crime rate. The non-monotonicity of the crime rate is driven by a similar mechanism
as in Engelhardt et al. (2008), who show that the crime rate is non-monotonic in the
worker's bargaining power. For low minimum wages, as for low bargaining powers, the
worker has a larger incentive to commit crimes because his labor market outcomes are
low in terms of wages. As the minimum wage increases, or bargaining power increases,
the worker's incentive to commit crimes decreases because his labor market outcomes
in terms of wages increase. However, once the minimum wage increase above a certain
point, the probability he nds a feasible match is too low and his labor market outcomes
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decease because of high unemployment, which increases his incentive to commit crime.
Similarly in Engelhardt et al. (2008) a high bargaining power for the worker decreases the
rms incentive to open vacancies, decreasing the workers labor market outcomes through
high unemployment, increasing his incentive to commit crimes. As Flinn (2006) points
out, one can think of the minimum wage as a policy tool that increases the worker's
bargaining power.
1.6.1 Empirical Evidence
Figure 1.9 shows that the model predicts the minimum wage to have a U-shaped
eect on the crime rate. In this section I use county level crime data from 1995 to
2014 to test this prediction. The county level crime data come from the FBI's UCR;
the data include the number of Type 1 property primes (burglary, larceny, and motor
vehicle theft) and the number of robberies, classied as a Type 1 violent crime, reported
to the police. The variable of interest is the minimum to median wage ratio, which is
constructed at the state level for 16 to 19 year olds using the Current Population Survey's
Outgoing Rotation Groups. Since crimes reported to the police can not be broken up by
age, I test the U-shape prediction on the aggregate crime rate in the county. Figure 1.10
shows the variation of the minimum to median wage ratio over the full sample. The
average minimum to median wage ratio is 0.86 with a standard deviation of 0.08. A full
description of the data can be found in appendix section A.1.4.
I test the prediction of the model using a non-parametric regression of county level
crime rates on state level variation of the minimum to median wage ratio. The minimum
to median wage ratio is binned into quintiles; Table 1.8 gives the mean and median value
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Figure 1.10: Minimum to Median Wage Ratio Histogram
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in each quintile. The model that is estimated is as follows:
crimect = 1+
5X
j=2
1j1fMMst 2 (q(j   1); q(j)]g+ 6Xct + 7crimect 1 + c + "ct
(1.46)
where q(j) is the jth quintile of the minimum to median wage ratio (MM) in state
s at time t, and 1 is the indicator function. c are county xed eects and Xct are
demographic controls, the poverty rate, and the log of average household income in
county c in year t. The specication includes a lag dependent variable to capture county
level trends in the crime rate. The specication is estimated for ve dependent variables:
burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, total Type 1 property crimes (the sum of burglary,
larceny and motor vehicle theft) and robbery. Since ordinary least squares (OLS) delivers
inconsistent estimates with xed eects and lagged dependent variables,13 I use the second
13See ? for reference.
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Table 1.8: Mean Real Binding Minimum Wage by Quantile
Quintile
Min-to-Median Ratio
Mean Median
1 0.738 0.736
2 0.816 0.817
3 0.871 0.863
4 0.915 0.906
5 0.962 0.964
lag, crimect 2, to instrument for the rst lag, as suggested by ?.
Table 1.9 gives the estimated coecients on the quintiles of the minimum to median
wage ratio for each dependent variable under OLS. Column (1) of Table 1.9 shows that
moving from the rst quintile to the third quintile of the minimum to median wage ratio
has a negative and signicant eect on property crimes within the county, decreasing
property crimes by 82 crimes per 100,000 people. Moving from the rst to the fourth
quintile decreases property crimes by 120 crimes per 100,000 people. Moving from the
rst to the fth quintile has a negative and signicant eect on crime, however, the eect
is less than when moving to the fourth quintile. A move from the rst quintile to the
fth quintile decreases crime by 98 crimes per 100,000 people. Panel (a) of Figure 1.11
plots the estimated coecients at the mean minimum to median wage ratio of each
quintile, along with the 95% condence intervals. The gure reveals a clear U-shape in
the relationship between the minimum to median wage ratio and the property crime rate.
Comparing panel (a) of Figure 1.11 to Figure 1.9 shows that the model and empirical
exercise predict that the crime minimizing minimum to median wage ratio for 16 to 19
year olds is 0.91. Columns (2)   (5) of Table 1.9 and panels (b)   (e) reveal similar
U-shaped relationships for the disaggregated categories of Type 1 property crimes and
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Table 1.9: Regression Results: OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Property
Burglary Larceny
Motor Vehicle
RobberyCrimes Theft
Quintile of
Min-to-Median Ratio
2nd. -8.785 0.999 5.733 -5.829 -0.569
(7.762) (2.386) (5.199) (0.950) (0.318)
3rd. -81.74 -6.178 -15.13 -9.961 -1.491
(8.996) (2.739) (6.093) (1.131) (0.399)
4th. -120.4 8.876 -8.960 -15.53 -1.883
(8.988) (2.878) (5.835) (1.134) (0.414)
5th. -97.76 19.94 2.854 -13.90 -0.515
(9.572) (3.073) (6.450) (1.123) (0.399)
Mean Dep. Variable 2370.83 564.94 1566.92 152.30 40.61
N 51,418 51,418 51,418 51,418 51,418
Standard errors clustered at the county level. All specications include demographic controls,
county xed eects, household income, poverty levels and a lag dependent variable.  p <
0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
robbery.
Table 1.10 gives the estimated coecients on the quintiles of the minimum to median
wage ratio for each dependent variable for the instrumental variable (IV) regression. The
magnitudes of the eect of a move from the rst quintile to subsequent quintiles dier
from the IV estimates to the OLS estimates but the U-shaped relationship continues
to hold. A move from the rst quintile to all higher quintiles is negative for property
crimes. However, a move from the rst quintile to the fth quintile is smaller in absolute
magnatude than a move from the rst to the fourth quintile, suggesting a U-shaped
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Table 1.10: Regression Results: IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Property
Burglary Larceny
Motor Vehicle
RobberyCrimes Theft
Quintile of
Min-to-Median Ratio
2nd. -6.064 -0.288 6.580 -4.511 -0.681
(7.727) (2.375) (5.173) (0.904) (0.332)
3rd. -87.48 -10.28 -23.52 -9.196 -1.929
(8.492) (2.540) (5.641) (1.042) (0.400)
4th. -115.4 3.903 -12.12 -12.33 -2.432
(8.235) (2.646) (5.209) (0.982) (0.378)
5th. -104.4 13.65 -4.954 -11.96 -1.553
(8.959) (2.941) (5.917) (1.017) (0.351)
First Stage F-Stat 2,334.8 1,068.3 2,540.2 2,494.4 1,189.0
N 50,619 50,619 50,619 50,619 50,619
Standard errors clustered at the county level. All specications include demographic controls,
county xed eects, household income, poverty levels. The lagged dependent variable is
instrumented with the second lag.  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
relationship between the minimum to median wage ratio and the property crime rate.
Similar relationship between the minimum to median wage ratio and the burglary, larceny,
motor vehicle theft, and robbery rates can be seen in columns (2)  (5) of Table 1.10.
To test the strength of the U-shape relationships revealed in the non-parametric
regression, I test for equality among the estimated coecients on the quintiles of the
minimum to median wage ratio. Table 1.11 gives the F statistic and corresponding p-
values for each test for both the OLS and IV results. Column (4) tests if all coecients
are simultaneously equal; the test shows a constant eect of the minimum to median
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Figure 1.11: Regression Coecients
(a) Property Crimes
−100
−50
0
0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
Min−to−Median Wage Ratio
Ch
an
ge
 p
er
 1
00
,0
00
(b) Burglary
−10
0
10
20
0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
Min−to−Median Wage Ratio
Ch
an
ge
 p
er
 1
00
,0
00
(c) Larceny
−20
−10
0
10
0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
Min−to−Median Wage Ratio
Ch
an
ge
 p
er
 1
00
,0
00
(d) Motor Vehicle Theft
−15
−10
−5
0
0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
Min−to−Median Wage Ratio
Ch
an
ge
 p
er
 1
00
,0
00
(e) Robbery
−2
−1
0
0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
Min−to−Median Wage Ratio
Ch
an
ge
 p
er
 1
00
,0
00
47
Crime and the Minimum Wage Chapter 1
wage ratio on all crimes can be ruled out for estimates from both specications. Since
the estimated coecient on the fth quintile is less than the fourth quintile for property
crimes, column (3) tests for the U-shape relationship. Column (3) rules out that the
decrease in property crimes from moving from the rst quintile to the fourth quintile is
equal to a move from the rst quintile to the fth quintile of the minimum to median
wage ratio with a p-value of 0:003 for the estimates from the OLS specications. For the
estimates from the IV specications, the test shows that the decrease in the property
crime rate from moving from the rst quintile to the fourth quintile is equal to a move
from the rst quintile to the fth quintile can be ruled out at 13% signicance level with
a p-value of 0:12. Similarly, linearity can be ruled out for the other crime categories
under the OLS specications, and for burglary and robbery for the IV specication.
Appendix section A.1.6 shows the U-shaped relationship is robust to dierent speci-
cations. Table A.1 shows that the U-shaped pattern is robust to excluding the lagged
dependent variable for all crime categories, and dispalys a much stronger U-shape for the
eect of the minimum to median wage ratio on the property crime rate. Table A.2 shows
that the U-shape is preserved with the inclusion of both linear and quadratic time trends
at the national and state level. Finally, Table A.3 and Table A.4 show that the U-shape
is also revealed when the eect of the minimum to median wage ratio on the crime rate
is parameterized using a quadratic function.
1.7 Welfare
Since the model is stationary, the welfare analysis in this section will consider the
long term outcomes of a minimum wage. The workers in the model can be in one of ve
states at any given point in time: unemployed and committing crimes (uc), unemployed
and not committing crimes (unc), employed and committing crimes (ec), employed and
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Table 1.11: Signicance of Coecients
Test of Coecient on Quintile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2 = 3 3 = 4 4 = 5 2 = 3 = 4 = 5
Property Crimes
F-stat: OLS 66.39 27.17 9.13 50.16
p-value: OLS 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
F-stat: IV 94.81 14.77 2.38 60.73
p-value: IV 0.000 0.000 0.122 0.000
Burglary
F-stat: OLS 6.56 33.30 16.77 30.21
p-value: OLS 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-stat: IV 13.59 30.04 13.31 24.84
p-value: IV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Larceny
F-stat: OLS 11.46 1.47 5.57 5.97
p-value: OLS 0.001 0.225 0.018 0.001
F-stat: IV 25.11 5.28 2.19 9.34
p-value: IV 0.000 0.022 0.140 0.000
Motor Vehicle Theft
F-stat: OLS 17.75 32.73 3.87 34.92
p-value: OLS 0.000 0.000 0.049 0.000
F-stat: IV 23.91 12.64 0.23 26.26
p-value: IV 0.000 0.000 0.6319 0.000
Robbery
F-stat: OLS 5.51 1.39 21.58 9.12
p-value: OLS 0.019 0.238 0.000 0.000
F-stat: IV 9.92 1.98 9.15 8.73
p-value: IV 0.002 0.159 0.003 0.000
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not committing crimes (enc), or in prison (p). Assuming the minimum wage is the only
policy instrument available to the social planner, the planner wishes to maximize the
following objective function:
W (m) = unc(m) Vunc(m) + uc(m) Vuc(m) + enc(m) Venc(m)
+ ec(m) Vec(m) + p(m) Vp(m)
where i(m) is the size of the set of workers in state i 2 fuc; unc; ec; enc; pg and Vi is the
average welfare level in state i, expressions for Vi(m) can be found in appendix section
A.1.3.
Figure 1.12: Welfare
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The top panel of Figure 1.12 plots welfare for dierent levels of the minimum wage.
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The gure reveals that welfare is maximized at a $4.30 minimum wage, which corresponds
to a minimum to median wage ratio of 0.865, see the bottom panel of Figure 1.12. The
welfare maximizing minimum wage is dierent than the crime minimizing minimum wage
because the minimum wage aects aggregate welfare through changes in the unemploy-
ment rate, expected wages and crime. Over the range of minimum wages for which crime
is decreasing in the minimum wage, an increase in the minimum wage increases welfare
through increases in expected wages and decreases in crime and decreases welfare only
through increases in the unemployment probability. For larger minimum wages, in the
range over which crime is increasing, an increase in the minimum wage increases welfare
only through increases in expected wages and decreases welfare by increasing the crime
rate and increasing the unemployment probability. The welfare maximizing minimum
wage, $4.30, implies a monthly crime rate of 0.07 crimes per person.
Figure 1.13 plots the same welfare function for the model without crime (e = 0; u =
0;  = 0)14. The welfare maximizing minimum wage in this case is $3, which corresponds
to a minimum to median wage ratio of 0.7. The model does not consider the eect of
a minimum wage on crime; therefore, welfare is maximized at a lower minimum wage.
In this case, the welfare increases from a decreasing crime rate are ignored. If policy
makers ignore the eects of changes in the minimum wage on crime, choosing the welfare
maximizing minimum wage, $3, implies a monthly crime rate of 0.11 crimes per person,
57% higher than when considering the eects of the minimum wage on crime.
14The model without crime was recalibrated to match the unemployment rate, job nding rate,
minimum wage to median wage ratio and the median wage to 75th percentile wage ratio. All parameters
in Table 1.2 remain the same. The job destruction rate and parameters of the ability distribution in
Table 1.3 remain the same. The estimated mean and variance of the job productivity distribution,
the oer arrival rate, and ow unemployment utility are: ^ = 0:8111, ^ = 0:535, ^j = 3:958, and
b^ =  28:723.
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Figure 1.13: Welfare Without Crime
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1.8 Conclusion
The minimum wage has been discussed extensively around the country, leading many
states and cities to increases minimum wages by real amounts that we have not seen
in the past. The increases are targeted to improve labor market condition primarily for
young and unskilled workers; however, increasing the minimum wage may have unforeseen
eects on these workers' decisions to commit crimes. I have shown that the relationship
between the aggregate crime rate and the minimum wage is U-shaped due to two opposing
eects: the wage eect and the unemployment eect. Which eect dominates, and
ultimately how the aggregate crime rate will change depends on how much the minimum
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wage increases. The calibrated model, as well as the empirical evidence from county level
crime rates shows that the crime rate is minimized when the minimum wage is 0.91 of
the median wage of 16 to 19 year olds. However, the crime minimizing minimum wage
is not the welfare maximizing minimum wage, since not only crime eects welfare but
all labor market outcomes. The welfare maximizing minimum to median wage ratio is
0.87. If policy makers abstract from the eect of a minimum wage on crime, the welfare
maximizing minimum to median wage ratio is 0.7, leaving crime 42% higher than when
considering the eects of the wage oor on crime.
The goal of this paper is to establish the relationship between the minimum wage and
the crime rate, and quantify the eects. Many cities across the country have recently
passed or proposed legislation that moves to increase the minimum wage well above
any threshold found in this paper, notably Seattle, New York City and California have
moved to push the oor to $15 per hour. These increases would surely lead to minimum
to median wage ratios for young and uneducated workers well above not only the welfare
maximizing levels, but also the crime minimizing levels. As the discussion about the
minimum wage and its eects on the labor market continues, it is my hope that policy
makers use the ideas presented in this paper and consider the consequences on crime.
53
Chapter 2
Testing the Independence of Job
Arrival Rates and Wage Oers in
Models of Job Search
Joint with Ben Griy, Bryan Engelhardt, and Peter Rupert
2.1 Introduction
Is the arrival rate of a job independent of the wage that it pays? The random search
model of Pissarides (2000) assumes a worker's search intensity determines the number of
job oers they receive, but productivity of the job is drawn randomly, and therefore wages
are independent of arrival rates. Alternatively, the competitive search model of Moen
(1997) assumes the existence of submarkets characterized by job arrival rates and wages.
In this paper, we test the dening feature between these types of models. Specically,
we test the assumption that job nding rates and the wages oered are independent,
conditional on a set of worker characteristics.
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We show that a testable implication of the independence of job arrival rates and wages
is that the semi-elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to unemployment insurance (UI)
is constant across the wage distribution. We test this using a mixed proportional hazards
competing risks (MPHCR) model with data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 1997 (NLSY97). We nd that the semi-elasticity of the hazard with respect to UI
and other worker characteristics is not constant across the wage distribution. Therefore,
we reject the null hypothesis that the arrival rate of a job is independent of the wage
that it pays.
We nd that an increase in UI decreases the hazard rate more for low wages than for
high wages. Specically, if UI is collected in the rst nine weeks of unemployment, the
hazard rate decreases by 32% for wages above the 75th percentile and by 63% for wages
between the 25th and 75th percentiles. The dierences are robust to specications of
the baseline hazard rate and is particularly prominent for those with only a high school
degree.
Beyond testing for independence, we analyze three prominent job-search models and
show how they map into our testable implication. We show that in search models of
random matching and bargaining with match-specic productivity, and on-the-job search,
as described in Rogerson et al. (2005), job arrival rates and wage oers are independent
while in competitive search they are not. Our results are in line with a competitive search
environment but inconsistent with many models of random search and matching. Given
how our results are applicable in dierentiating types of job-search models, our work
is similar to other work comparing random and competitive search such as Engelhardt
and Rupert (2017) and Moen and Gody (2011). Distinguishing between random and
competitive search has implications for labor market policies. In models of random
search, workers may ineciently reject jobs in equilibrium. For this reason, labor market
policies that reduce this ineciency may be welfare improving in this class of models.
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Under competitive search, workers do not reject jobs in equilibrium. Absent additional
frictions, labor market policies are not welfare improving in models of competitive search.
Aside from how our results map into prominent job-search models, we help shed some
light onto the matching process. We show that conditional on observable characteristics
and unobservable heterogeneity, the job arrival rate is correlated with the wage of a
job. The presence of this correlation may have ramications for empirical studies of
frictional wage dispersion, as these studies rely on the independence of job oers and
wages to quantify the degree to which wage dispersion is caused by search frictions, see
for example Burdett et al. (2016) and Hornstein et al. (2011). Similarly, such a correlation
has implications for modeling the way in which workers match to jobs and the degree of
mismatch within the labor market. Recent studies of sorting and mismatch again fail to
incorporate such a correlation by specifying a matching function that is independent of
job productivity, see for example Gautier et al. (2010), Gautier and Teulings (2015), and
Lise et al. (2016).
2.2 Independence of Wages and Job Arrival Rates
In this section, we present a theoretical framework in which the arrival rate of jobs
is or is not independent of the wage oered conditional on worker characteristics. All
of the tests will be conditional on worker characteristics and we will refer to this simply
as independence. Assume that there exists J dierent wages, where J = jJ j and J =
fw1; w2; : : : ; wJg, and the probability of drawing each wage wj is P (Xi(t); w = wj; t)
where t is time, and Xi(t) is worker i's characteristics at time t. The job arrival rate at
time t for wage wj > w
i
R, where w
i
R is the reservation wage of worker i, is composed of the
probability the worker receives a job arrival, (Xi(t); t), times the probability of drawing
wage wj. The hazard rate for transitioning to a particular wage, when job arrival rates
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are independent of the wages oered is
h(Xi(t); wj; t) = (Xi(t); t)P (Xi(t); w = wj; t); (2.1)
a common assumption in many standard job-search models. The total hazard rate of
transitioning to employment at time t is
h(Xi(t); t) =
JX
wjwiR
(Xi(t); t)P (Xi(t); w = wj; t)
= (Xi(t); t)P (Xi(t); w  wR; t): (2.2)
Alternatively, if job arrival rates are dependent on the wage oered the hazard rate
is
h(Xi(t); wj; t) = j(Xi(t); t)P (Xi(t); w = wj; t) (2.3)
= j(Xi(t); t): (2.4)
where the job arrival rate, j(Xi(t); t), is specic to the wage wj and therefore P (Xi(t); w =
wj; t) = 1. If the job arrival rate is wage specic, the total hazard of leaving unemploy-
ment to any wage above the reservation wage is
h(Xi(t); t) =
JX
wjwiR
h(Xi(t); wj; t):
Assume there exists a factor X that has no eect on the distribution of wages oered,
i.e., @P (Xi; wj)=@ X = 0, but has an eect on the job arrival rate, @j(Xi; t)=@ X 6= 0.
Then if job arrival rates are independent of the wage oered, the semi-elasticity of the
hazard with respect to X is
@h(Xi;wi;t)
@X
h(Xi; wi; t)
=
@(Xi;t)
@X
P (Xi; wj)
(Xi; t)P (Xi; wj)
=
@(Xi;t)
@X
(Xi; t)
for all wj > w
i
R: (2.5)
Factors that do not aect the wage oered should aect the hazard rate uniformly across
the distribution of wages; the semi-elasticity with respect to X does not dier across
wages.
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We test for independence by examining how changes in unemployment insurance (UI)
aects the hazard rate across the wage distribution. In the case of independence, if UI
rises, the hazard rate changes uniformly across the wage distribution. Alternatively, if
the job arrival rate and the wage oered are dependent, then the semi-elasticity of the
hazard rate with respect to UI diers across the wage distribution.
2.3 Data
To test the independence assumption, we use data from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (1997), conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, for the years
1997 through 2009. The survey tracks men and women in the United States over time
who were between 12 and 16 in 1997. We use the individual-level panel data set in-
formation on gender, education, race, age, urban status, hourly wage, unemployment
insurance collection status, searching for a job, and labor force status over time. With
the information on labor force status, we are able to determine whether an individual is
employed, not employed and searching for work, or not employed and not searching for
work.
We use a ow sampling approach to construct the data set that we use in our analysis.
This means that we record the beginning of each duration when an individual transitions
into a new labor force state as dened by employed or not employed. We limit the
number of observations per individual starting each state to ten and begin tracking an
individual's weekly labor force status after an individual has completed his or her most
recently obtained level of education. Our starting point follows Bowlus et al. (1995),
Eckstein and Wolpin (1995) and Engelhardt (2010) among others. When a respondent
transitions into a new labor force state, the duration is recorded as well as why the state
ended. We cut the data in two ways and refer to each as the standard and inclusive
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data sets. In what we dene as the \standard," we record the time the unemployed is in
the unemployed state and capture whether he or she became employed. If an individual
transitions out of the labor force during a spell, then the spell is excluded from the
standard data set following van den Berg and Ridder (1998), Bontemps et al. (2000),
among many others. We analyze this less inclusive cut of the data because it is eectively
the standard as it aligns with most theoretical search models focused on those strictly
in the labor force. Alternatively, the second \inclusive" data set estimates the model
where unemployment is redened as not employed. As a result, the number of spells
greatly increases. To account for whether an individual is searching, we include a time
varying covariate that records whether an individual is searching for a job. We do not
estimate two states, unemployed and outside the labor force, because many individuals
transition from outside the labor force to employment in our data (a standard empirical
fact). To keep the notation and terminology of the empirical model simple, we will dene
the unemployed and those outside the labor force as not employed for both data sets.
Estimation using the standard and inclusive data sets is eectively identical with this
rewording.
In terms of notation, we account for how an individual spell ends. Our notation
for individuals who are hired while not employed (or unemployed) is d = 1 and zero
otherwise. The duration of time spent not employed is represented by t. Some of the
durations are censored as seen by the fact that the mean number of individuals transition
to employment is not one. The model we estimate assumes censoring occurs randomly
and the estimation is adjusted accordingly. In these cases, d = 0. We cut the data
into three submarkets at the 25th and 75th percentiles, as required by our empirical
specication; therefore if a duration ends with a low, medium, or high wage draw, then
we represent the event as dL = 1, dM = 1, and dH = 1, respectively. If a duration ends
and the wage oer is missing, then di = 0 for i 2 fL;M;Hg and the missing observations
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are assumed to occur randomly and the probability is excluded. The covariates used
in the analysis are the respondent's gender, years of schooling completed, race, urban
status, age, wage at the time of transition to employment, and a dummy for whether
the individual is collecting unemployment insurance. When using the inclusive data
set, a dummy for whether an individual is searching for employment is incorporated
into the covariates. We dene X(t) as the baseline covariates for the not employed,
which includes unemployment insurance, and in the case of the inclusive data set, job
searching. Due to the non-parametric baseline, computational weight of the model,
and known measurement issues, the unemployment insurance (UI) collection status is
a dummy variable equal to one if the individual collected UI in any particular 10 week
interval. Similarly, whether a worker is searching for employment is averaged over 10
week intervals. Intervals are collected for the rst 50 weeks and one nal variable for all
the time after 50 weeks.
The descriptive statistics of the not employed for each data set are in Table 2.1.
2.4 Empirical Specication
We build our test on the duration literature and specically the MPHCR model.
If there exist J dierent wages, where J = jJ j and J is the set of all wages, then
the observed failure time T is the minimum of the failure time at each wage, that is,
T = mini2J (Ti) and the cause of failure, I, is the argument minimum. In terms of a
competitive search model, the cause of failure is observed by the wage, that is, if an
individual leaves unemployment to a wage j 2 J , then failure is caused by matching at
wj. Thus, we observed the joint distribution (T;W ) where W identies the argument
minimum I.
It is well known that without further assumptions the latent distribution of failure
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times is not identied from the observed distribution (T;W ) (Cox (1959)). We impose a
mixed proportional hazard structure so that latent failure times depend multiplicatively
on the observed regressors, duration length and unobserved heterogeneity. Heckman and
Honore (1989) show identication of such models relies on variation in latent failure
times with the regressors. Abbring and van den Berg (2003) relax this assumption and
show that less variation is needed with multiple independent draws from an individual's
observed distribution, that is, multiple spells.
We rely on the MPHCR model to identify a baseline hazard across time for each
wage, wj(t), that is constant for all individuals, an unobservable component, V
n
wj
, that
is individual specic that varies across wages, and an individualized observable compo-
nent e
PK
k=1 
k
jX
k
i (t) = ejXi(t), for wage j, individual i, and covariates k = 1; :::; K. The
functional form is described in detail in Abbring and van den Berg (2003) including the
notation we are using such as the matrix notationXi(t) and i. This results in three types
of heterogeneity: matching rates across wages are heterogeneous in terms of matching
time, and individuals are heterogeneous with respect unobservable and observable fac-
tors (e.g., value of leisure and age, respectively). We assume three wage categories, a
low wage (wL), a medium wage (wM), and a high wage (wH), in which individuals can
nd jobs; and three unobservable components, or n = f0; 1; 2g. For example, V 0wL can
imply low search intensity of an individual of type \0" in nding a low wage job and V 1wM
can imply high search intensity of an individual of type \1" in nding a medium wage
job. Since we only use two continuous covariates, we are restricted to estimating three
dierent wages due to identication restrictions. Furthermore, we do not include more
than three individual unobservable factors because the t does not improve signicantly
after three.
Given the unobservable components, number of markets, and non-parametric ap-
proach, we are left to identify a discrete distribution of agents with 33 points of support.
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For example, individual of type Xi(t) with an unobservable type n = 0 across all wages
will match at rate wL(t)e
LXi(t)V 0wL for wL, at rate wM (t)e
MXi(t)V 0wM for wM and at
rate wH (t)e
HXi(t)V 0wH for wH making the worker's total hazard rate:
(t) = wL(t)e
LXi(t)V 0wL + wM (t)e
MXi(t)V 0wM + wH (t)e
HXi(t)V 0wH : (2.6)
The probability of observing an unemployment spell of length t ending with a wage w
for the individual described above is:
f(t; w;Xi(t)) = (t)e
 (t)

wL(t)e
LXi(t)V 0wL
(t)
dLwM (t)eMXi(t)V 0wM
(t)
dMwH (t)eHXi(t)V 0wH
(t)
dH
(2.7)
= e (t)(wL(t)e
LXi(t)V 0wL)
dL(wM (t)e
MXi(t)V 0wM )
dM (wH (t)e
HXi(t)V 0wH )
dH
(2.8)
where dj is a dummy that takes on the value 1 if w = wj is observed for j 2 fL;M;Hg
and 0 otherwise.
2.4.1 Likelihood Function
Since we allow for three types of unobserved heterogeneity in each wage hazard the
support for the mixing distribution has 27 points. Denote pk, k = 1; : : : ; 27 as the
probability associated with each point in the support and
V = f(V 0wL ; V 0wM ; V 0wH ); (V 1wL ; V 0wM ; V 0wH ); : : : ; (V 2wL ; V 2wM ; V 2wH )g
as the set of points in the support. Following the identication restrictions in Heckman
and Honore (1989) and Abbring and van den Berg (2003), we normalize the mixing
distribution in each market such that V 0wL = V
0
wM
= V 0wH = 1.
An individual's contribution to the likelihood function is:
li =
27X
k=1
pk
10Y
s=1
f(ts; wsjXi(t); V ) (2.9)
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where ts is the length of unemployment spell, and s = 1; 2; : : : 10 is the maximum number
of possible spells per individual. Note the multiple spells for each individual, or stratum,
provides both power and dependence between the covariates and unobservables. The
total log likelihood function is:
L(fpkg27k=1; fwj(t); jgj2fL;M;Hg; fV nwjg(j2fL;M;Hg;n=1;2)jX; t; w) =
NX
i=1
log(li) (2.10)
We estimate the likelihood function for two specications for the baseline hazard: Weibull,
wj(t) =
kj
aj
 
t
aj
kj 1 where aj is the scale parameter and kj is the shape parameter in
market j and piecewise exponential, wj(t) = 
q
wj
, where q = 1 : : : ; 6 is allowed to vary
at 10 week intervals and is constant after the rst 50 weeks.
2.4.2 Likelihood Ratio Tests
We construct and estimate the MPHCR model to test for the independence between
wage oers and job arrival rates, i.e., (2.2). We test for independence using (2.5), i.e.,
semi-elasticities are constant across wages. We test for a constant semi-elasticity by
restricting the coecients on individual characteristics and the mixing distribution. Since
changes in individual characteristics such as age or education can change the reservation
wage, we focus on changes across the medium and high wage hazards.
The semi-elasticities, such as those described in (2.5), for the MPHCR model with
respect to unobserved heterogeneity at the medium and high wages are
@h(Xi(t);wM ;t)
@V nwM
h(Xi(t); wM ; t)
=
wM (t)e
MXi(t)
wM (t)e
MXi(t)V nwM
=
1
V nwM
; and similarly
@h(Xi(t);wH ;t)
@V nwH
h(Xi(t); wH ; t)
=
1
V nwH
: (2.11)
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The semi-elasticitiies of the MPHCR model with respect to a specic individual charac-
teristic k in the medium and high wage markets are
@h(Xi(t);wM ;t)
@Xki (t)
h(Xi(t); wM ; t)
=
wM (t)
k
Me
MXi(t)V nwM
wM (t)e
MXi(t)V nwM
= kM ; and similarly
@h(Xi(t);wH ;t)
@Xi(t)
h(Xi(t); wH ; t)
= kH : (2.12)
Therefore, if the independence assumption holds, or (2.2) and (2.5), then
V nwM = V
n
wH
; and (2.13)
kM = 
k
H (2.14)
for s of factors that do not eect the distribution of wages, i.e. @P (Xi(t); w = wj; t)=@Xi(t)
k =
0. In other words, the the independence assumption implies a series of linear restrictions
in the MPHCR model.
We test the linear restrictions using a likelihood ratio test. To explore the series of
restrictions, we group them in several dierent ways to get an understanding of what
might be the specic factor rejecting the null hypothesis of independence. Furthermore,
the test requires @P (Xi(t); w = wj; t)=@Xi(t)
k = 0. Therefore, we articulate a variety of
restrictions in case the assumption does not hold for certain group of factors.
In what we call group 1, or restriction 1, we test all the restrictions we'll examine.
Specically, we test whether unobserved heterogeneity, unemployment insurance, search,
and urban status aects the hazard rate dierently for the high and medium wage market.
If we fail to reject these restrictions, then we cannot reject that semi-elasticities for these
variables are constant across the medium and high wage hazards. In other words, we will
fail to reject the independence assumption under the assumption these variables do not
aect the wage distribution. In terms of the parameters, we are testing
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Restriction 1: H
(1)
0 : V
1
wM
= V 1wH
V 2wM = V
2
wH
UIwM = 
UI
wH
UrbanwM = 
Urban
wH
SearchwM = 
Search
wH
As some of the variables might not satisfy the assumption that they do not aect
wage oers, we introduce several other groupings/restrictions. In restriction 2, we test
for whether we can reject the null using only unobserved heterogeneity, or
Restriction 2: H
(2)
0 : V
1
wM
= V 1wH
V 2wM = V
2
wH
In restriction 3, we test whether the semi-elasticities of the hazard rate with respect
to UI, urban status, and job search varies across the wage distribution:
Restriction 3: H
(3)
0 : 
UI
wM
= UIwH
UrbanwM = 
Urban
wH
SearchwM = 
Search
wH
Finally, we estimate our least strict restriction in which we assume only UI does not
aect the underlying wage distribution and thus restrict its semi-elasticity across wage
hazards to
Restriction 4: H
(4)
0 : 
UI
wM
= UIwH
To reiterate, Restriction 4 allows all other factors to aect the wage oer except
UI. Also, the results related to this restriction is a key application to testing for the
independence assumption. In particular, as discussed in Acemoglu and Shimer (2000)
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among others, UI could allow for workers to search for more productive jobs. If we fail to
reject the independence assumption, then we will be putting such an analysis in doubt.
Given the restricted groupings, we refer to the unrestricted estimation of the model, as
found in (2.10), as the baseline and use the unrestricted version to evaluate the restricted
versions using likelihood ratio tests.
2.5 Estimation Results
The estimation results regarding the eect of demographic variables on the arrival
rates of jobs, as well as the baseline time dependent hazard, line up with past studies. For
references, Devine and Kiefer (1991) and Eckstein and Van den Berg (2007) provide in
depth surveys on the empirical search literature with the former more closely related to
our work given its focus on reduced form approaches. Tables 2.2, 2.4, 2.6, and 2.9 provide
a summary of our results including the results from Restrictions 1-4 for the Weibull hazard
with standard data, Weibull hazard with the inclusive data, the piecewise exponential
hazard with the standard data, and the piecewise exponential with the inclusive data,
respectively. Tables 2.3, 2.5, 2.8, and 2.11 provide the estimates from the demographic
eects including UI for the Weibull hazard with standard data, Weibull hazard with the
inclusive data, the piecewise exponential hazard with the standard data, and the piecewise
exponential with the inclusive data, respectively. Finally, Tables 2.7 and 2.10 provide
estimates for the piecewise exponential baseline using the standard and inclusive data
sets, respectively. The estimated probabilities pk for k = 1; ::; 27 have been suppressed
for brevity, but can be provided upon request.
In terms of race and gender, our estimates are in line with the broader wage literature
as surveyed in Darity and Mason (1998) and many other places. Specically, we estimate
males are more likely to transition to high wage jobs and less likely to transition to low
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wage jobs across all the specications and restrictions. Hispanics are relatively equally
less likely to transition to any wage job while blacks are less likely to transition to high
wage jobs with little or no eect for low wage jobs. Bowlus (1997) and Bowlus and
Eckstein (2002) are two similar examples to ours that empirically analyze gender and
racial discrimination, respectively.
In terms of education and experience, our results are in line with the classic Mincerian
earning equations as pioneered in Mincer (1974) and more generally surveyed in Card
(1999). Specically, we nd the level of schooling as well as a high school diploma
increases the rate of transition to employment and more so for high wage jobs. Individuals
with a college diploma are less likely to transition to low and medium wage jobs while
more likely to transition to high wage jobs. Similarly, experience, as proxied by age,
generally increases transition to high wage jobs and reduces transitions to low wage jobs
although note the low dispersion in our data's age distribution.
In terms of the baseline hazard, the Weibull and piecewise exponential estimates show
duration dependence to be eectively constant in the standard data set. The estimates
for the inclusive data set provide evidence for the theoretically intuitive result of negative
duration dependence. Given the nature of each data set, the dierence in the results under
each data set suggests the ability to transition from outside the labor force decreases over
time. Intuitively, job oers are less likely to arrive the longer you've been unemployed
when you aren't searching. However, if searching, duration dependence is less of a factor,
if at all. These estimates are in line with other empirical studies as surveyed in Devine
and Kiefer (1991).
A critical insight of our work is to expand the literature regarding the eects of UI
on job nding rates, such as in Meyer (1990) and others. Our ndings are consistent
with those studies in that UI reduces job nding rates. However, we extend the work
by showing the negative impact of UI on job nding rates falls for higher wage jobs.
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Specically, individuals are much less likely to transition to low wage jobs when collecting
UI. However, this eect is less pronounced at higher wages. Put dierently, UI reduces
the transition rate for medium wage jobs more than for higher wage jobs. Restriction 1,
3 and 4, or where the coecients on UI are equal across the wage types, is rejected at the
1% level in both types of baseline specications and data sets. As UI discourages search,
the results strongly suggest UI discourages search at the low end of the wage distribution
more and less so at the upper end. We note this was predicted by Moen (1997) and
others assuming UI aects the value of leisure when unemployed. Put dierently, the
competitive search assumption is critical in the analysis of UI as shown in Acemoglu
and Shimer (2000) and others. Given our empirical results, the assumption of changing
job nding rates across the wage oer distribution should be used when considering the
ecacy of UI.
In terms of Restrictions 1 & 3, urban status was also considered and constrained
with the assumption it is aecting job search specically. The estimates are relatively
consistent and show those in urban areas are more likely to transition to high wage jobs
and less likely to transition to low wage jobs. However, the estimates are small relative
to the eect of UI as well as its standard errors. The estimates are in line with the
empirical work such as that surveyed in Holzer (1991). Refer to Wasmer and Zenou
(2002) for modeling the dynamics in a search environment.
Under the inclusive data set, we estimate the eect of job search on the arrival rate
of jobs. Furthermore, we include it in the Restriction 1 & 3 tests. We nd it increases
the transition rate for the low and medium wage hazards as the search literature suggests
and more so for the low wages. Its impact on high wage jobs appears ambiguous and is
an interesting fact for further study. Note, the standard errors are relatively large.
Finally, we test for variation in the unobservable factors. Historically, the literature
has suggested search costs, which are unobservable, can explain the fact that individuals
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with low wages spend more time unemployed (Eckstein and Wolpin (1995)). As a result,
these factors can be interpreted as search intensity. Given this view, we reject that search
intensity is constant across wages at the 1% level in Restrictions 1 and 2 in all our results:
the Weibull and piecewise exponential baseline and the standard and inclusive data sets.
In eect, unobservable search intensity is variable after controlling for the reservation
wage. Our results along this line, as well as those testing urban status's semi-elasticity,
should be interpreted with caution as these unobservable factors could be aecting the
likelihood of accepting an oer and not simply nding an opportunity.
2.6 Test Results
As noted above in Section 2.5, we nearly uniformly reject at the 5% level the restric-
tions imposed by (2.2), or more specically, (2.5) for either of the dierent specications
of the data or baseline hazard. In particular, the eects of all the variables considered
aect the medium and high wage dierently! In other words, we reject the idea that
the wage oer and job arrival rate are independent even after controlling for worker
characteristics.
We run two dierent types of robustness checks of our results. In particular, what
happens when the low, medium, and high wage thresholds are dependent upon an in-
dividuals education. Furthermore, how does the functional form of the MPHCR model
compare to a standard search model.
2.6.1 Test Results with Education Based Wage Thresholds
In terms of controlling for years of schooling and graduation status, we vary the
duration of unemployment by these factors. However, education is not being used to
determine the denition of low, medium, and high wage thresholds. As a check of our
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results given this restrictive assumption required by the MPHCR model, we re-estimate
the model by education group, that is, we assume there are separate markets by level of
education, and given the separate markets, we redene low, medium, and high wages by
education type.
The descriptive statics of wages by education and accompanying thresholds are pro-
vided in Table 2.12. The results from the likelihood ratio tests are provided in Tables
2.13 and 2.14 for the Weibull and piecewise exponential specications, respectively. In
the separated case, we continue to reject all the restrictions at roughly the 5% signicance
level when looking at those with a High School education or less. We fail to reject the
restrictions in the case of the College educated. However, the dierence may be arising
from the fact that we observe very few unemployment spells for the college educated
relative to the number of parameters being estimated. However, it would be interesting
to analyze the education component further if the identication strategy allowed it.
2.6.2 Applicability of Reduced-Form Estimates
We take a exible reduced form approach to test the assumptions used in labor market
search models. Therefore, our results can arguably be applied to the literature as a whole.
However, the reduced form approach we take still contains some structure. In particular,
we use a proportional hazard function. As a result, the identication strategy we employ
may not be exible enough to t the entire class of search models. To investigate the
issue, we simulate data using the model and parameter estimates from Eckstein and
Wolpin (1995) and estimate our reduced from model using the simulated data. We then
estimate the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence of our model to the true data generating
model of Eckstein and Wolpin (1995). Dene q as the probability distribution of duration
times produced from our reduced from estimates, and p as the probability distribution
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of duration times from the true model. The KL distance is dened as
DKL(pjjq) =
Z 1
0
p(t) ln

p(t)
q(t)

dt
where t represents time. As we note below, in our interpretation, DKL is relative to the
entropy of the true distribution, given by
H(p) =
Z 1
0
p(t) ln[p(t)]dt;
and measures the additional data required to capture the true model using the incorrect
one. The entropy of the true distribution, H(p), measures the uncertainty of duration
times, which can be interpreted as how informative a draw from the distribution is
for understanding the underlying random variable, unemployment duration. The KL
distance is the relative entropy between the true distribution of duration times and the
distribution of duration times estimated by our reduced form approach. The entropy of
our reduced form model is H(p) +DKL(pjjq). If DKL = 0 then a draw from our reduced
form model is exactly as informative about the duration of unemployment as a draw from
the true distribution; therefore, we use the KL distance as a measure of how informative
our reduced form model it about the true distribution of unemployment duration times.
The Kullback-Leibler divergence values are in Table 2.15 where we give the KL values
for the dierent sub-markets estimated in Eckstein and Wolpin (1995). Although the
Eckstein and Wolpin (1995) estimates have enormous exibility by re-estimating the
parameters for each sub-market, we estimate all the markets simultaneously. Therefore,
our unobservable heterogeneity in particular is not as exible as that found in what we
assume to be the true model.
Given the interpretation of KL, we require between 1.65% and 5.37% additional bits
of information to describe the distribution of unemployment duration using our reduced
form version depending upon the sub-market one's considering. Given the limited amount
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of information required to describe the Eckstein and Wolpin (1995) versus our reduced
form estimates, we argue the reduced form estimation can adequately capture more
specic search models.
2.7 Application to Common Models
In this section, we discuss two sets of models our results reject. Due to the large
and varied literature on labor market search models, we discuss two classic examples in
which the hazard rate of unemployment does and does not respond as we have shown. Let
(w;X) equal the rate at which an individual transitions from not employed to employed
with a wage w where X is observable and unobservable factors aecting an individual's
transition rate. Finally, let wR represent an individual's reservation wage. Specically,
if wi < wR, then (wi; X) = 0. To reiterate, for a model's hazard rate to be consistent
with the data it must satisfy the following criterion:
@h(Xi;wi;t)
@X
h(Xi; wi; t)
6=
@h(Xi;wj ;t)
@X
h(Xi; wj; t)
(2.15)
for any wi 6= wj, the semi-elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to some observable
or unobservable factor that aects the oer rate cannot be constant across wages. To
show how this applies to common search models of the labor market, we discuss the
hazard rate of two well cited search models.
Example 1: Random Matching and Bargaining with Match-Specic Produc-
tivity
We are dening this example using the terminology described in Rogerson et al.
(2005), which surveys a large group of search models found in Section 4.4 of their paper.
The model describes a wide variety of models in the literature. Following the notation
and description in Rogerson et al. (2005), one can determine the model's equilibrium
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with two conditions,
yR = b+
!k
e(1  ) ; and (2.16)
(r + )k = e(1  )
Z 1
yR
(y   yR)dF (y); (2.17)
where y is productivity, yR the reservation wage, b is unemployment utility,  is a bar-
gaining parameter, k is the vacancy cost for a rm to hold a job open until lled, r is the
discount rate, e is the rate a rm matches with a worker and ! is the rate a worker
matches with a rm, and  the job destruction rate.
Given the standard equilibrium conditions,
(w; b) = !f

w   (1  )yR(b)


(2.18)
because w = yR + (y   yR). Notice that the underlying unobservable characteristic
that determines the reservation wage is the unemployment utility b. Therefore, the only
observable or unobservable factor X that could change the hazard rate is b. Below we
suppress the reservation wage's dependence on b, i.e. yR = yR(b), for ease of notation.
If one assumed that b is a function of unobservables and an observable unemployment
insurance (UI) component, then the result would be
@(w;b)
@b
(w; b)
=
@!
@b
f

w (1 )yR


+ !
@f

w (1 )yR


@yR
@yR
@b
!f

w (1 )yR

 ; (2.19)
and the criterion
@(wi;b)
@b
(wi; b)
6=
@(wj ;b)
@b
(wj; b)
in this model would simplify from
@!
@b
f

wi (1 )yR


+ !
@f

wi (1 )yR


@y
@yR
@b
!f

wi (1 )yR

   @!@b f

wj (1 )yR


+ !
@f

wj (1 )yR


@y
@yR
@b
!f

wj (1 )yR

 6= 0
(2.20)
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to
@f

wi (1 )yR


@y
f

wi (1 )yR

   @f

wj (1 )yR


@y
f

wj (1 )yR

 6= 0: (2.21)
Given the simplied model and interpretation of b and UI, the criterion is satised and
our results do not reject this model. Our criterion does not reject this model because
the distribution f(y) is not discrete or at and bargaining exists. To put it dierently, if
the surplus was split evenly irrespective of the reservation wage, or drawing a particular
wage is uniformly distributed, then the model would fail our criterion test.
However, the naive interpretation of b as being a function of UI is not correct. In par-
ticular, UI is only collected when an individual is laid o due to lack of work. Therefore,
the workers outside option used during the bargaining does not include UI. As a result,
the standard model must be rewritten. Following the notation of Rogerson et al. (2005),
the ow utility for unemployed workers is either
rU = b+ !
Z 1
yR
(Wy[w(y)]  U)dF (y); or (2.22)
rUUI = b+ bUI + !
Z 1
yR
(Wy[w(y)]  U)dF (y) (2.23)
where the latter is the asset value of unemployment for those laid o collecting UI, i.e.,
those who lose their jobs, and the former equation determines the asset value used as the
threat point in the Nash bargaining process. As a result, the wage equation becomes
w = rU + (y   rU); (2.24)
and the hazard rate becomes
(w; b) = !f

w   (1  )rU(b)


: (2.25)
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As U is not a function of whether an individual is collecting UI, our empirical results
reject this more accurate representation of the model. Specically,
@(w; b)
@bUI
= 0; (2.26)
for all w > yR and as a result the elasticity is constant across w.
To summarize, our criterion for this class of models rejects them when UI does not
change the bargaining position of the workers. However, in the naive case, we fail to
reject these models due to bargaining.
Although we will not prove it here, it may be of interest that one could extend the
model to include search intensity. In such a case, @!
@b
6= 0. As it is equal across wage
draws, we reject these predictions using our empirical estimates.
Example 2: On-the-Job Search via Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
Again following the notation in Rogerson et al. (2005), for the simplest case where
the arrival rates of job oers while unemployed (0) and employed (1) are equal, 0 =
1 =  and the interest rate is approximately zero, r  0, the wage oer distribution is
F (w) =
 + 


1 
r
y   w
y   b

(2.27)
where  is the separation rate, y is the productivity of the job, and b is the worker's
ow value of unemployment. The support of F is [b; w] for some w < y where the upper
bound can be found using F ( w) = 1. It can be shown that (2.27) is continuous on its
support; therefore, the derivative exists and the p.d.f. is:
f(w) =
 + 
2
s
y   b
y   w: (2.28)
Given the p.d.f of the wage distribution, the hazard rate of matching at wage w is,
(w; b) = f(w) (2.29)
=
( + )
2
s
1
(y   w)(y   b) (2.30)
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and the elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to b is,
@(w;b)
@b
(w; b)
=
1
2(y   b) (2.31)
Since the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the workers unemployment
insurance as dened by b is independent of the wage at which they match, the model
fails to satisfy our empirical results.
Example 3: Competitive Search via Moen (1997)
Following notation from Moen (1997)1, the probability a worker receives a job oer
from sub market i is
p(i) =
rU   b
wi   rU (r + s): (2.32)
The hazard rate to matching to wage wi is given by
(wi; b) = p(i)prob(w = wi) (2.33)
=
rU   b
wi   rU (r + s) (2.34)
since prob(w = wi) = 1 if matching in submarket i.
The semi-elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to b is,
@(w;b)
@b
(w; b)
=
@rU
@b
w   rU +
@rU
@b
  1
rU   b : (2.35)
Since the value of search U must be the same across submarkets it is clear that the
semi-elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to b is not constant across wages.
To summarize, our rejection of the independence assumption has the implication
of rejecting two canonical job-search models: Random matching and Bargaining with
Match-Specic Productivity, and On-the-Job Search. However, in a model of compet-
itive search in which workers are identical, job arrival rates and wage oers are not
independent.
1We have changed the ow value of unemployment from z to b for consistency across examples.
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2.8 Conclusion
Using a multi-spell mixed proportional hazards competing risks model with National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1997) data, we reject the assumption that the semi-
elasticity of the hazard rate is constant for factors which do not change the wage dis-
tribution. We show that this assumption can be rejected if these factors include un-
employment insurance, urban status, and unobservable characteristics. In other words,
after controlling for worker characteristics, we reject an assumption that the wage and
job arrival rates are independent.
The implications are important in interpreting the eect of UI as well as job-search
models in general. In particular, we have shown our results reject two well used models in
the job-search literature. Furthermore, we provide empirical support for the hypothesis
that UI aects job hiring rates dierently across the wage oer distribution.
Given the importance of unemployment insurance and the use of search in modeling
the duration of unemployment, our results are an important step in dening the future
trajectory of the search literature. In particular, our results point heavily toward a world
where workers search in a market where wage oers and the rate of job arrivals are not
independent.
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2.9 Tables
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of Unemployed
Standard Data Set Inclusive Data Set
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Hired (d = 1) 0.92 0.27 0.9 0.31
Duration unemployed (t) 11.15 14.2 24.34 44.06
Wage 12.81 24.24 16.56 131.04
Low wage (dL = 1) 0.22 0.41 0.21 0.41
Medium wage (dM = 1) 0.42 0.49 0.41 0.49
High wage (dH = 1) 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41
Male 0.61 0.49 0.52 0.5
Black 0.31 0.46 0.29 0.45
Hispanic 0.19 0.4 0.21 0.41
Education, years completed 11.75 2.25 11.79 2.31
High School, completed 0.82 0.38 0.81 0.39
College, completed 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29
Urban 0.89 0.31 0.89 0.31
Age 22.99 3.04 22.89 2.99
UI Collected, weeks 1-9 0.12 0.32 0.05 0.22
Searched for Employment, weeks 1-9 1 0 0.39 0.45
Observations 5308 17593
Note: Observations are based on each spell not employed and not on each
individual who could be not employed one or more times. Durations are weekly.
Transitions do not sum to one due to right censoring. Wage bins do not sum
to one due to missing values. Missing data on wages, education, and urban
status is assumed to occur randomly and observations are excluded from the
estimation.
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Table 2.2: Summary of Results: Weibull Hazard with Standard Data
Restriction
(1) (2) (3) (4) unrestricted
V 1wL 0.2139 0.2119 4.0578 0.2478 4.0918
V 2wL 4.7575 0.0472 18.3742 4.5099 18.5591
V 1wM 0.1954 0.1900 0.2360 0.0990 0.2338
V 2wM 3.6357 3.5354 2.4196 0.4169 2.4549
V 1wH 0.1954 0.1900 0.0215 0.1905 0.0262
V 2wH 3.6357 3.5354 0.1914 0.0213 0.2036
UI-low -1.4427 -1.4670 -1.4382 -1.4384 -1.4656
(-1.82,-1.09) (-1.86,-1.11) (-1.82,-1.08) (-1.82,-1.09) (-1.87,-1.11)
UI-medium -0.8398 -1.0468 -0.8542 -0.8551 -1.0393
(-1.01,-0.68) (-1.25,-0.83) (-1.03,-0.69) (-1.03,-0.69) (-1.23,-0.83)
UI-high -0.8398 -0.4607 -0.8542 -0.8551 -0.5169
(-1.01,-0.68) (-0.76,-0.24) (-1.03,-0.69) (-1.03,-0.69) (-0.80,-0.27)
Urban-low -0.0873 -0.0910 -0.0968 -0.1017 -0.1017
(-0.31,0.18) (-0.31,0.18) (-0.32,0.16) (-0.32,0.17) (-0.32,0.15)
Urban-medium 0.2249 -0.0487 0.2159 -0.0511 0.1872
(0.03,0.41) (-0.07,-0.03) (0.04,0.40) (-0.07,-0.03) (-0.01,0.38)
Urban-high 0.2249 0.2557 0.2159 0.3122 0.3099
(0.03,0.41) (-0.06,0.63) (0.04,0.40) (-0.06,0.72) (-0.05,0.69)
aL 0.0657 0.0143 0.2356 0.0597 0.2441
(0.03,0.15) (0.01,0.04) (0.11,0.66) (0.03,0.15) (0.11,0.65)
aM 9.2550 10.0264 9.6728 4.1466 10.4067
(5.09,26.69) (5.82,29.89) (5.78,24.71) (2.08,8.66) (6.24,25.88)
aH 1313.2464 1006.1187 182.1945 186.3248 175.2755
(570.04,3745.22) (440.75,3068.80) (61.38,635.00) (62.66,710.94) (60.57,631.72)
kL 1.0219 1.0217 1.0209 1.0211 1.0217
(0.98,1.08) (0.98,1.08) (0.97,1.08) (0.98,1.09) (0.97,1.08)
kM 1.0537 1.0643 1.0415 1.0413 1.0502
(1.00,1.10) (1.02,1.12) (1.01,1.09) (1.01,1.09) (1.01,1.10)
kH 1.0745 1.0555 1.1076 1.1084 1.0861
(1.02,1.15) (1.01,1.13) (1.05,1.20) (1.05,1.20) (1.03,1.17)
lnL -19347.7622 -19339.3965 -19340.2380 -19340.0085 -19333.1813
LR test 29.1618 12.4303 14.1133 13.6544
p-value 0.0000 0.0020 0.0009 0.0002
Note:The number of degrees of freedom used in the likelihood ratio test for Restriction
1,2,3, and 4 are 4,2,2, and 1, respectively. 95% bootstrap intervals in parenthesis.
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Table 2.3: Coecient Estimates: Weibull Hazard with Standard Data
Restriction
(1) (2) (3) (4) unrestricted
wL market
Male -0.6463 -0.6447 -0.6410 -0.6411 -0.6423
(-0.81,-0.47) (-0.81,-0.47) (-0.80,-0.48) (-0.80,-0.47) (-0.80,-0.48)
Black -0.0394 -0.0364 -0.0195 -0.0188 -0.0229
(-0.24,0.18) (-0.24,0.17) (-0.21,0.18) (-0.23,0.18) (-0.21,0.17)
Hispanic -0.2974 -0.3010 -0.2985 -0.2972 -0.2984
(-0.53,-0.04) (-0.53,-0.06) (-0.54,-0.07) (-0.53,-0.06) (-0.54,-0.08)
Education -0.0553 -0.0552 -0.0559 -0.0560 -0.0559
(-0.10,0.00) (-0.10,0.00) (-0.10,0.00) (-0.10,0.00) (-0.10,0.00)
High School 0.0580 0.0596 0.0730 0.0735 0.0731
(-0.18,0.30) (-0.19,0.29) (-0.15,0.29) (-0.19,0.30) (-0.15,0.30)
College -0.4867 -0.4812 -0.4722 -0.4709 -0.4723
(-1.02,-0.03) (-1.03,-0.02) (-1.01,-0.02) (-1.02,-0.03) (-1.03,-0.01)
Urban -0.0873 -0.0910 -0.0968 -0.1017 -0.1017
(-0.31,0.18) (-0.31,0.18) (-0.32,0.16) (-0.32,0.17) (-0.32,0.15)
Age -0.2530 -0.2523 -0.2539 -0.2538 -0.2527
(-0.29,-0.22) (-0.29,-0.22) (-0.29,-0.22) (-0.29,-0.22) (-0.29,-0.22)
UI -1.4427 -1.4670 -1.4382 -1.4384 -1.4656
(-1.82,-1.09) (-1.86,-1.11) (-1.82,-1.08) (-1.82,-1.09) (-1.87,-1.11)
wM market
Male 0.0304 0.0316 0.0136 0.0130 0.0135
(-0.13,0.15) (-0.13,0.15) (-0.11,0.14) (-0.11,0.14) (-0.12,0.14)
Black -0.4741 -0.4899 -0.4549 -0.4537 -0.4668
(-0.60,-0.32) (-0.62,-0.34) (-0.59,-0.31) (-0.59,-0.31) (-0.60,-0.33)
Hispanic -0.1905 -0.1959 -0.1787 -0.1759 -0.1779
(-0.34,-0.02) (-0.35,-0.03) (-0.33,-0.01) (-0.33,-0.01) (-0.33,-0.02)
Education 0.0429 0.0432 0.0386 0.0386 0.0398
(-0.00,0.09) (-0.00,0.10) (-0.00,0.09) (-0.00,0.09) (0.00,0.09)
High School 0.2407 0.2431 0.2693 0.2708 0.2706
(0.05,0.48) (0.05,0.51) (0.07,0.49) (0.08,0.49) (0.07,0.49)
College -0.4962 -0.5014 -0.4656 -0.4636 -0.4751
(-0.84,-0.20) (-0.85,-0.20) (-0.80,-0.17) (-0.80,-0.17) (-0.80,-0.20)
Urban 0.2249 0.2194 0.2159 0.1883 0.1872
(0.03,0.41) (0.00,0.42) (0.04,0.40) (0.01,0.39) (-0.01,0.38)
Age -0.0534 -0.0487 -0.0517 -0.0511 -0.0472
(-0.07,-0.03) (-0.07,-0.03) (-0.07,-0.03) (-0.07,-0.03) (-0.07,-0.03)
UI -0.8398 -1.0468 -0.8542 -0.8551 -1.0393
(-1.01,-0.68) (-1.25,-0.83) (-1.03,-0.69) (-1.03,-0.69) (-1.23,-0.83)
wH market
Male 0.3740 0.3735 0.3691 0.3693 0.3758
(0.19,0.59) (0.18,0.58) (0.15,0.61) (0.14,0.61) (0.13,0.60)
Black -1.0700 -1.0383 -1.1103 -1.1127 -1.0666
(-1.33,-0.83) (-1.30,-0.81) (-1.38,-0.86) (-1.39,-0.86) (-1.34,-0.81)
Hispanic -0.1253 -0.1461 -0.1778 -0.1867 -0.1693
(-0.39,0.14) (-0.40,0.13) (-0.41,0.13) (-0.42,0.11) (-0.42,0.13)
Education 0.1994 0.1958 0.1955 0.1943 0.1941
(0.14,0.28) (0.14,0.27) (0.13,0.27) (0.12,0.28) (0.13,0.27)
High School 0.4156 0.3850 0.4685 0.4734 0.4335
(0.05,0.80) (0.06,0.76) (0.10,0.82) (0.09,0.83) (0.08,0.75)
College 0.1770 0.2103 0.2636 0.2624 0.2671
(-0.18,0.54) (-0.15,0.54) (-0.19,0.63) (-0.20,0.63) (-0.14,0.59)
Urban 0.2249 0.2557 0.2159 0.3122 0.3099
(0.03,0.41) (-0.06,0.63) (0.04,0.40) (-0.06,0.72) (-0.05,0.69)
Age 0.0553 0.0440 0.0619 0.0601 0.0461
(0.02,0.09) (0.01,0.08) (0.02,0.10) (0.02,0.10) (0.01,0.08)
UI -0.8398 -0.4607 -0.8542 -0.8551 -0.5169
(-1.01,-0.68) (-0.76,-0.24) (-1.03,-0.69) (-1.03,-0.69) (-0.80,-0.27)
Note: 95% bootstrap intervals in parenthesis.
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Table 2.4: Summary of Results: Weibull Hazard with Inclusive Data
Restriction
(1) (2) (3) (4) unrestricted
V 1wL 0.0299 0.0301 3.5387 0.0307 0.0308
V 2wL 0.2829 0.2836 0.1053 0.2845 0.2846
V 1wM 0.1036 0.0942 0.0545 0.0588 0.0590
V 2wM 3.6067 3.6119 0.3203 0.3262 0.3253
V 1wH 0.1036 0.0942 0.0956 0.0851 0.0857
V 2wH 3.6067 3.6119 5.1366 4.8292 4.7895
UI-low -1.0486 -1.0498 -1.0491 -1.0467 -1.0499
(-1.31,-0.82) (-1.30,-0.82) (-1.30,-0.82) (-1.30,-0.82) (-1.31,-0.82)
UI-medium -0.7563 -0.7945 -0.7647 -0.7201 -0.7901
(-0.86,-0.65) (-0.94,-0.67) (-0.87,-0.65) (-0.83,-0.62) (-0.93,-0.66)
UI-high -0.7563 -0.5763 -0.7647 -0.7201 -0.5914
(-0.86,-0.65) (-0.76,-0.38) (-0.87,-0.65) (-0.83,-0.62) (-0.78,-0.38)
Search-low 0.6342 0.6464 0.6350 0.6468 0.6474
(0.54,0.73) (0.55,0.75) (0.54,0.74) (0.55,0.75) (0.55,0.75)
Search-medium 0.2651 0.4617 0.2727 0.4574 0.4657
(0.20,0.32) (0.39,0.54) (0.20,0.33) (0.38,0.54) (0.39,0.54)
Search-high 0.2651 -0.2322 0.2727 -0.2075 -0.2343
(0.20,0.32) (-0.35,-0.12) (0.20,0.33) (-0.32,-0.07) (-0.35,-0.09)
Urban-low -0.1189 -0.1203 -0.1164 -0.1190 -0.1192
(-0.24,0.02) (-0.25,0.02) (-0.24,0.02) (-0.25,0.02) (-0.25,0.02)
Urban-medium 0.1202 0.1062 0.1177 0.1008 0.0998
(0.01,0.22) (-0.00,0.21) (0.01,0.21) (-0.01,0.20) (-0.01,0.20)
Urban-high 0.1202 0.1790 0.1177 0.1932 0.1955
(0.01,0.22) (-0.08,0.38) (0.01,0.21) (-0.06,0.41) (-0.06,0.42)
aL 0.1318 0.1316 0.6396 0.1326 0.1326
(0.05,0.31) (0.05,0.22) (0.20,1.14) (0.04,0.29) (0.04,0.22)
aM 542.9676 565.4240 102.8465 102.5173 104.3179
(330.95,881.33) (356.80,888.65) (56.65,157.13) (52.30,327.17) (54.08,163.32)
aH 49855.9353 49854.7140 49853.9882 49854.3001 49854.1379
(49854.80,49875.31) (49853.49,49859.27) (49853.92,59498.28) (49854.28,56203.36) (49854.09,83603.59)
kL 0.8039 0.8036 0.8041 0.8038 0.8038
(0.79,0.82) (0.78,0.82) (0.78,0.83) (0.78,0.82) (0.78,0.82)
kM 0.7956 0.7999 0.7934 0.7971 0.7981
(0.78,0.81) (0.78,0.82) (0.78,0.81) (0.78,0.81) (0.78,0.81)
kH 0.8337 0.8316 0.8468 0.8485 0.8459
(0.81,0.86) (0.81,0.86) (0.82,0.87) (0.82,0.87) (0.82,0.87)
lnL -70434.2613 -70370.9237 -70420.6155 -70360.0084 -70358.2940
LR test 151.9346 25.2594 1013.3394 3.4290
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0641
Note:The number of degrees of freedom used in the likelihood ratio test for Restriction
1,2,3, and 4 are 5,2,3, and 1 respectively. 95% bootstrap intervals in parenthesis.
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Table 2.5: Coecient Estimates: Weibull Hazard with Inclusive Data
Restriction
(1) (2) (3) (4) unrestricted
wL market
Male -0.2933 -0.2927 -0.2932 -0.2929 -0.2929
(-0.40,-0.20) (-0.42,-0.20) (-0.42,-0.20) (-0.42,-0.20) (-0.42,-0.20)
Black -0.0255 -0.0254 -0.0204 -0.0217 -0.0222
(-0.18,0.07) (-0.16,0.07) (-0.16,0.07) (-0.16,0.07) (-0.16,0.07)
Hispanic -0.1854 -0.1865 -0.1833 -0.1861 -0.1868
(-0.35,-0.07) (-0.35,-0.06) (-0.35,-0.06) (-0.36,-0.07) (-0.34,-0.07)
Education 0.0140 0.0138 0.0143 0.0142 0.0141
(-0.03,0.05) (-0.03,0.05) (-0.03,0.05) (-0.03,0.05) (-0.03,0.05)
High School 0.1115 0.1114 0.1081 0.1093 0.1091
(-0.03,0.26) (-0.02,0.26) (-0.04,0.25) (-0.03,0.25) (-0.03,0.25)
College -0.1578 -0.1441 -0.1564 -0.1462 -0.1467
(-0.43,0.17) (-0.47,0.18) (-0.48,0.18) (-0.45,0.18) (-0.46,0.19)
Urban -0.1189 -0.1203 -0.1164 -0.1190 -0.1192
(-0.24,0.02) (-0.25,0.02) (-0.24,0.02) (-0.25,0.02) (-0.25,0.02)
Age -0.2174 -0.2173 -0.2174 -0.2173 -0.2173
(-0.24,-0.20) (-0.24,-0.20) (-0.24,-0.20) (-0.24,-0.20) (-0.24,-0.20)
UI -1.0486 -1.0498 -1.0491 -1.0467 -1.0499
(-1.31,-0.82) (-1.30,-0.82) (-1.30,-0.82) (-1.30,-0.82) (-1.31,-0.82)
Searching 0.6342 0.6464 0.6350 0.6468 0.6474
(0.54,0.73) (0.55,0.75) (0.54,0.74) (0.55,0.75) (0.55,0.75)
wM market
Male 0.2055 0.1704 0.2090 0.1746 0.1752
(0.13,0.29) (0.10,0.25) (0.14,0.29) (0.10,0.26) (0.11,0.26)
Black -0.3691 -0.3766 -0.3671 -0.3727 -0.3748
(-0.46,-0.27) (-0.46,-0.28) (-0.46,-0.28) (-0.46,-0.28) (-0.47,-0.28)
Hispanic -0.1568 -0.1508 -0.1625 -0.1558 -0.1562
(-0.26,-0.06) (-0.25,-0.05) (-0.26,-0.06) (-0.25,-0.06) (-0.26,-0.06)
Education 0.1009 0.1012 0.1004 0.1003 0.1007
(0.07,0.13) (0.07,0.13) (0.08,0.13) (0.07,0.13) (0.07,0.13)
High School 0.3064 0.3003 0.3073 0.3021 0.3029
(0.17,0.42) (0.18,0.43) (0.18,0.44) (0.18,0.43) (0.18,0.43)
College -0.4377 -0.4504 -0.4342 -0.4459 -0.4490
(-0.64,-0.26) (-0.63,-0.27) (-0.61,-0.25) (-0.63,-0.26) (-0.63,-0.26)
Urban 0.1202 0.1062 0.1177 0.1008 0.0998
(0.01,0.22) (-0.00,0.21) (0.01,0.21) (-0.01,0.20) (-0.01,0.20)
Age -0.0013 -0.0016 -0.0019 -0.0034 -0.0027
(-0.01,0.01) (-0.01,0.01) (-0.01,0.01) (-0.01,0.01) (-0.01,0.01)
UI -0.7563 -0.7945 -0.7647 -0.7201 -0.7901
(-0.86,-0.65) (-0.94,-0.67) (-0.87,-0.65) (-0.83,-0.62) (-0.93,-0.66)
Searching 0.2651 0.4617 0.2727 0.4574 0.4657
(0.20,0.32) (0.39,0.54) (0.20,0.33) (0.38,0.54) (0.39,0.54)
wH market
Male 0.6730 0.6928 0.6901 0.7110 0.7097
(0.51,0.83) (0.56,0.87) (0.52,0.86) (0.58,0.89) (0.57,0.89)
Black -1.0501 -1.0267 -1.1085 -1.0789 -1.0677
(-1.22,-0.87) (-1.20,-0.85) (-1.27,-0.86) (-1.25,-0.84) (-1.25,-0.84)
Hispanic -0.1828 -0.1653 -0.2375 -0.2047 -0.1946
(-0.35,0.02) (-0.34,-0.00) (-0.40,0.01) (-0.38,0.03) (-0.39,0.03)
Education 0.1947 0.1943 0.1929 0.1942 0.1942
(0.16,0.23) (0.16,0.23) (0.15,0.24) (0.15,0.23) (0.15,0.24)
High School 0.4333 0.4265 0.5088 0.4707 0.4666
(0.19,0.71) (0.18,0.73) (0.21,0.79) (0.21,0.78) (0.21,0.79)
College 0.3867 0.3067 0.3811 0.3198 0.3284
(0.07,0.69) (0.09,0.65) (0.06,0.77) (0.07,0.67) (0.05,0.67)
Urban 0.1202 0.1790 0.1177 0.1932 0.1955
(0.01,0.22) (-0.08,0.38) (0.01,0.21) (-0.06,0.41) (-0.06,0.42)
Age 0.1222 0.1208 0.1245 0.1228 0.1211
(0.10,0.14) (0.10,0.14) (0.10,0.14) (0.10,0.14) (0.10,0.14)
UI -0.7563 -0.5763 -0.7647 -0.7201 -0.5914
(-0.86,-0.65) (-0.76,-0.38) (-0.87,-0.65) (-0.83,-0.62) (-0.78,-0.38)
Searching 0.2651 -0.2322 0.2727 -0.2075 -0.2343
(0.20,0.32) (-0.35,-0.12) (0.20,0.33) (-0.32,-0.07) (-0.35,-0.09)
Note: 95% bootstrap intervals in parenthesis.
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Table 2.6: Summary of Results: Piecewise Exponential with Standard Data
Restriction
(1) (2) (3) (4) unrestricted
V 1wL 0.2396 0.2388 0.2402 0.2411 0.2414
V 2wL 0.0729 0.0714 0.0748 0.0756 0.0751
V 1wM 0.2597 0.2689 0.5213 0.5293 0.5364
V 2wM 0.0684 0.0632 0.1461 0.1488 0.1493
V 1wH 0.2597 0.2689 0.1590 0.1585 0.1796
V 2wH 0.0684 0.0632 3.9545 3.9680 3.8295
UI-low -1.3166 -1.3446 -1.3189 -1.3188 -1.3454
(-1.71,-0.98) (-1.72,-1.01) (-1.70,-0.98) (-1.70,-0.98) (-1.71,-1.01)
UI-medium -0.7534 -0.9995 -0.7609 -0.7613 -0.9957
(-0.88,-0.63) (-1.17,-0.81) (-0.89,-0.63) (-0.89,-0.63) (-1.17,-0.81)
UI-high -0.7534 -0.3487 -0.7609 -0.7613 -0.3841
(-0.88,-0.63) (-0.59,-0.17) (-0.89,-0.63) (-0.89,-0.63) (-0.59,-0.18)
Urban-low -0.1057 -0.1024 -0.1023 -0.1062 -0.1058
(-0.31,0.14) (-0.31,0.14) (-0.31,0.14) (-0.31,0.14) (-0.31,0.14)
Urban-medium 0.2027 0.1940 0.2009 0.1817 0.1788
(0.06,0.36) (0.03,0.37) (0.07,0.36) (0.02,0.35) (0.02,0.36)
Urban-high 0.2027 0.2574 0.2009 0.2636 -0.9957
(0.06,0.36) (-0.02,0.60) (0.07,0.36) (-0.04,0.61) (-1.17,-0.81)
lnL -19290.6370 -19279.2253 -19286.6209 -19286.5107 -19276.1730
LR test 28.9280 6.1047 20.8959 20.6754
p-value 0.0000 0.0472 0.0001 0.0000
Note: The number of degrees of freedom used in the likelihood ratio test for Restric-
tion 1,2, and 3 are 28,26, and 2, respectively. 95% bootstrap intervals in parenthesis.
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Table 2.7: Baseline Hazard Rate Estimates: Piecewise Exponential with Standard Data
Restriction
(1) (2) (3) (4) unrestricted
1L 66.9170 65.3203 68.1360 67.9360 66.3688
(33.23,70.00) (31.76,70.00) (32.99,70.00) (33.27,70.00) (32.22,70.00)
2L 49.0532 47.9645 50.0648 49.9075 48.8300
(24.92,59.91) (24.00,59.66) (24.49,59.92) (24.56,59.92) (23.94,60.12)
3L 46.8569 45.8900 47.8259 47.6626 46.6878
(22.18,60.32) (21.86,60.54) (21.62,60.02) (22.72,60.17) (21.23,60.26)
4L 51.8568 50.9190 52.9481 52.7805 51.6902
(26.19,70.00) (24.95,70.00) (24.65,70.00) (25.71,70.00) (24.87,70.00)
5L 42.8708 41.9775 43.4805 43.3459 42.4506
(18.68,65.68) (18.05,65.64) (18.45,66.61) (18.45,66.45) (17.88,66.68)
6L 38.1520 37.5770 38.4766 38.3071 37.5366
(14.78,70.00) (14.56,69.71) (15.00,69.96) (16.00,69.30) (14.70,70.00)
1M 0.4893 0.4150 0.2231 0.2206 0.1930
(0.20,1.05) (0.18,0.97) (0.10,0.55) (0.10,0.55) (0.09,0.48)
2M 0.3255 0.2820 0.1493 0.1477 0.1318
(0.14,0.67) (0.12,0.63) (0.07,0.37) (0.07,0.36) (0.06,0.33)
3M 0.3214 0.2820 0.1472 0.1455 0.1310
(0.12,0.74) (0.12,0.67) (0.07,0.37) (0.07,0.36) (0.06,0.33)
4M 0.3919 0.3500 0.1783 0.1762 0.1596
(0.15,0.90) (0.13,0.89) (0.08,0.45) (0.08,0.44) (0.07,0.41)
5M 0.3741 0.3381 0.1686 0.1667 0.1512
(0.13,0.85) (0.11,0.89) (0.07,0.47) (0.07,0.43) (0.07,0.40)
6M 0.2148 0.1990 0.0956 0.0945 0.0856
(0.08,0.55) (0.07,0.57) (0.04,0.27) (0.04,0.27) (0.03,0.23)
1H 0.0020 0.0042 0.0010 0.0010 0.0013
(0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00)
2H 0.0015 0.0030 0.0008 0.0008 0.0010
(0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00)
3H 0.0011 0.0022 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007
(0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00)
4H 0.0014 0.0027 0.0007 0.0007 0.0009
(0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00)
5H 0.0010 0.0019 0.0005 0.0005 0.0006
(0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00)
6H 0.0010 0.0021 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007
(0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00)
Note: 95% bootstrap intervals in parenthesis.
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Table 2.8: Coecient Estimates: Piecewise Exponential with Standard Data
Restriction
(1) (2) (3) (4) unrestricted
wL market
Male -0.5981 -0.5936 -0.5897 -0.5893 -0.5909
(-0.74,-0.43) (-0.74,-0.44) (-0.74,-0.44) (-0.74,-0.43) (-0.75,-0.44)
Black 0.0352 0.0291 0.0296 0.0298 0.0276
(-0.15,0.21) (-0.15,0.21) (-0.15,0.20) (-0.15,0.20) (-0.15,0.20)
Hispanic -0.2638 -0.2623 -0.2617 -0.2611 -0.2610
(-0.49,-0.04) (-0.48,-0.04) (-0.49,-0.04) (-0.49,-0.04) (-0.48,-0.04)
Education -0.0496 -0.0498 -0.0496 -0.0495 -0.0493
(-0.09,0.00) (-0.09,0.00) (-0.08,0.00) (-0.08,0.00) (-0.08,0.00)
High School 0.0219 0.0255 0.0249 0.0246 0.0252
(-0.19,0.22) (-0.19,0.22) (-0.19,0.22) (-0.19,0.22) (-0.19,0.22)
College -0.5022 -0.5101 -0.5140 -0.5142 -0.5156
(-1.05,-0.07) (-1.08,-0.08) (-1.14,-0.08) (-1.14,-0.08) (-1.11,-0.08)
Urban -0.1057 -0.1024 -0.1023 -0.1062 -0.1058
(-0.31,0.14) (-0.31,0.14) (-0.31,0.14) (-0.31,0.14) (-0.31,0.14)
Age -0.2387 -0.2377 -0.2391 -0.2390 -0.2380
(-0.27,-0.21) (-0.27,-0.21) (-0.27,-0.21) (-0.27,-0.21) (-0.27,-0.21)
UI -1.3166 -1.3446 -1.3189 -1.3188 -1.3454
(-1.71,-0.98) (-1.72,-1.01) (-1.70,-0.98) (-1.70,-0.98) (-1.71,-1.01)
wM market
Male 0.0270 0.0298 0.0277 0.0277 0.0258
(-0.08,0.14) (-0.09,0.14) (-0.09,0.14) (-0.09,0.14) (-0.09,0.13)
Black -0.3919 -0.4127 -0.3912 -0.3903 -0.4042
(-0.51,-0.27) (-0.53,-0.28) (-0.51,-0.27) (-0.50,-0.27) (-0.52,-0.28)
Hispanic -0.1699 -0.1743 -0.1675 -0.1655 -0.1680
(-0.31,-0.03) (-0.32,-0.03) (-0.31,-0.02) (-0.31,-0.02) (-0.31,-0.02)
Education 0.0366 0.0394 0.0398 0.0399 0.0415
(-0.00,0.08) (-0.00,0.08) (0.00,0.08) (0.00,0.08) (0.00,0.08)
High School 0.2215 0.2111 0.2150 0.2153 0.2167
(0.04,0.41) (0.04,0.41) (0.04,0.40) (0.04,0.40) (0.04,0.41)
College -0.4773 -0.4932 -0.4842 -0.4834 -0.4963
(-0.79,-0.21) (-0.80,-0.22) (-0.79,-0.23) (-0.79,-0.23) (-0.79,-0.24)
Urban 0.2027 0.1940 0.2009 0.1817 0.1788
(0.06,0.36) (0.03,0.37) (0.07,0.36) (0.02,0.35) (0.02,0.36)
Age -0.0456 -0.0405 -0.0452 -0.0448 -0.0394
(-0.06,-0.03) (-0.06,-0.02) (-0.06,-0.03) (-0.06,-0.03) (-0.06,-0.02)
UI -0.7534 -0.9995 -0.7609 -0.7613 -0.9957
(-0.88,-0.63) (-1.17,-0.81) (-0.89,-0.63) (-0.89,-0.63) (-1.17,-0.81)
wH market
Male 0.3913 0.3781 0.3724 0.3725 0.3660
(0.21,0.57) (0.19,0.56) (0.18,0.58) (0.18,0.58) (0.17,0.58)
Black -0.9528 -0.9379 -0.9809 -0.9828 -0.9348
(-1.20,-0.74) (-1.17,-0.69) (-1.24,-0.74) (-1.24,-0.74) (-1.18,-0.70)
Hispanic -0.1105 -0.1449 -0.1595 -0.1658 -0.1470
(-0.37,0.13) (-0.37,0.10) (-0.38,0.10) (-0.40,0.10) (-0.39,0.11)
Education 0.1948 0.1854 0.1870 0.1862 0.1833
(0.13,0.25) (0.13,0.25) (0.13,0.25) (0.13,0.25) (0.13,0.25)
High School 0.3282 0.3313 0.3894 0.3919 0.3659
(0.01,0.68) (-0.00,0.65) (0.05,0.72) (0.04,0.72) (0.05,0.67)
College 0.2121 0.2531 0.2579 0.2571 0.2808
(-0.10,0.55) (-0.07,0.56) (-0.10,0.58) (-0.11,0.58) (-0.09,0.61)
Urban 0.2027 0.2574 0.2009 0.2636 0.2608
(0.06,0.36) (-0.02,0.60) (0.07,0.36) (-0.04,0.61) (-0.02,0.60)
Age 0.0604 0.0431 0.0626 0.0615 0.0463
(0.03,0.09) (0.01,0.08) (0.03,0.09) (0.03,0.09) (0.01,0.08)
UI -0.7534 -0.3487 -0.7609 -0.7613 -0.3841
(-0.88,-0.63) (-0.59,-0.17) (-0.89,-0.63) (-0.89,-0.63) (-0.59,-0.18)
Note: 95% bootstrap intervals in parenthesis.
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Table 2.9: Summary of Results: Piecewise Exponential with Inclusive Data
Restriction
(1) (2) (3) (4) unrestricted
V 1wL 0.0168 0.0173 0.0171 0.0180 0.0180
V 2wL 0.2924 0.2939 0.2938 0.2950 0.2950
V 1wM 0.1245 0.1236 0.1549 0.1614 6.4302
V 2wM 3.3067 3.2538 2.9993 2.9250 19.0479
V 1wH 0.1245 0.1236 46.3672 46.2589 43.9762
V 2wH 3.3067 3.2538 8.6475 8.9545 8.7443
UI-low -1.0611 -1.0619 -1.0614 -1.0600 -1.0620
(-1.32,-0.82) (-1.32,-0.82) (-1.32,-0.82) (-1.32,-0.81) (-1.32,-0.82)
UI-medium -0.7301 -0.8037 -0.7312 -0.7042 -0.7945
(-0.83,-0.64) (-0.93,-0.68) (-0.84,-0.63) (-0.80,-0.60) (-0.92,-0.68)
UI-high -0.7301 -0.5135 -0.7312 -0.7042 -0.5288
(-0.83,-0.64) (-0.70,-0.33) (-0.84,-0.63) (-0.80,-0.60) (-0.74,-0.33)
Search-low 0.4115 0.4203 0.4118 0.4199 0.4201
(0.31,0.51) (0.32,0.52) (0.31,0.51) (0.32,0.52) (0.32,0.52)
Search-medium 0.0189 0.2053 0.0266 0.1989 0.2080
(-0.04,0.08) (0.13,0.27) (-0.03,0.08) (0.13,0.27) (0.14,0.28)
Search-high 0.0189 -0.4354 0.0266 -0.3902 -0.4224
(-0.04,0.08) (-0.55,-0.32) (-0.03,0.08) (-0.51,-0.28) (-0.54,-0.31)
Urban-low -0.1303 -0.1311 -0.1277 -0.1287 -0.1294
(-0.25,0.01) (-0.25,0.00) (-0.24,0.01) (-0.24,0.01) (-0.24,0.01)
Urban-medium 0.1255 0.1115 0.1295 0.1034 0.1039
(0.04,0.22) (-0.00,0.21) (0.04,0.22) (-0.01,0.20) (-0.01,0.20)
Urban-high 0.1255 0.1581 0.1295 0.1834 0.1798
(0.04,0.22) (-0.05,0.41) (0.04,0.22) (-0.01,0.45) (-0.01,0.44)
lnL -70061.1868 -70005.3872 -70048.1990 -69997.4836 -69993.9136
LR test 134.5463 22.9473 108.5708 7.1401
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0075
Note:The number of degrees of freedom used in the likelihood ratio test for Restriction
1,2,3, and 4 are 5,2,3 and 1, respectively. 95% bootstrap intervals in parenthesis.
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Table 2.10: Baseline Hazard Rate Estimates: Piecewise Exponential with Inclusive Data
Restriction
(1) (2) (3) (4) unrestricted
1L 3.7085 3.7136 3.5854 3.6268 3.7308
(2.58,6.24) (2.56,6.33) (2.57,6.50) (2.56,6.67) (2.55,6.67)
2L 2.1442 2.1454 2.0712 2.0952 2.1552
(1.43,3.72) (1.44,3.72) (1.46,3.74) (1.45,3.82) (1.46,3.88)
3L 1.7842 1.7840 1.7232 1.7419 1.7917
(1.22,3.10) (1.22,3.14) (1.21,3.28) (1.22,3.16) (1.23,3.25)
4L 1.7721 1.7713 1.7071 1.7287 1.7787
(1.23,3.22) (1.22,3.19) (1.24,3.19) (1.20,3.23) (1.21,3.21)
5L 1.7042 1.7029 1.6421 1.6618 1.7099
(1.16,3.16) (1.14,3.12) (1.15,3.07) (1.16,3.22) (1.14,3.24)
6L 1.1105 1.1073 1.0723 1.0812 1.1120
(0.77,2.01) (0.76,2.00) (0.76,2.03) (0.77,2.03) (0.76,2.03)
1M 0.0065 0.0063 0.0072 0.0073 0.0011
(0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.01) (0.01,0.01) (0.01,0.01) (0.00,0.00)
2M 0.0034 0.0033 0.0037 0.0038 0.0006
(0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.00)
3M 0.0029 0.0028 0.0031 0.0032 0.0005
(0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.00)
4M 0.0030 0.0029 0.0033 0.0034 0.0005
(0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.00)
5M 0.0027 0.0027 0.0030 0.0030 0.0005
(0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.00)
6M 0.0017 0.0016 0.0018 0.0019 0.0003
(0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00)
1H 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00)
2H 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00)
3H 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00)
4H 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00)
5H 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00)
6H 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00) (0.00,0.00)
Note: 95% bootstrap intervals in parenthesis.
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Table 2.11: Coecient Estimates: Piecewise Exponential with Inclusive Data
Restriction
(1) (2) (3) (4) unrestricted
wL market
Male -0.2668 -0.2670 -0.2658 -0.2678 -0.2689
(-0.38,-0.17) (-0.38,-0.17) (-0.38,-0.17) (-0.38,-0.17) (-0.38,-0.17)
Black -0.0031 -0.0025 0.0029 0.0016 0.0002
(-0.13,0.09) (-0.12,0.09) (-0.12,0.09) (-0.12,0.09) (-0.12,0.09)
Hispanic -0.1927 -0.1933 -0.1875 -0.1898 -0.1903
(-0.33,-0.07) (-0.33,-0.07) (-0.33,-0.07) (-0.33,-0.07) (-0.33,-0.07)
Education 0.0074 0.0072 0.0092 0.0089 0.0075
(-0.03,0.04) (-0.03,0.04) (-0.03,0.04) (-0.03,0.04) (-0.03,0.04)
High School 0.1034 0.1030 0.0945 0.0929 0.0948
(-0.02,0.24) (-0.02,0.24) (-0.03,0.23) (-0.03,0.24) (-0.03,0.24)
College -0.1896 -0.1839 -0.1958 -0.1901 -0.1843
(-0.48,0.14) (-0.48,0.14) (-0.48,0.12) (-0.48,0.14) (-0.48,0.15)
Urban -0.1303 -0.1311 -0.1277 -0.1287 -0.1294
(-0.25,0.01) (-0.25,0.00) (-0.24,0.01) (-0.24,0.01) (-0.24,0.01)
Age -0.2090 -0.2089 -0.2083 -0.2086 -0.2090
(-0.23,-0.19) (-0.23,-0.19) (-0.23,-0.19) (-0.23,-0.19) (-0.23,-0.19)
UI -1.0611 -1.0619 -1.0614 -1.0600 -1.0620
(-1.32,-0.82) (-1.32,-0.82) (-1.32,-0.82) (-1.32,-0.81) (-1.32,-0.82)
Searching 0.4115 0.4203 0.4118 0.4199 0.4201
(0.31,0.51) (0.32,0.52) (0.31,0.51) (0.32,0.52) (0.32,0.52)
wM market
Male 0.2444 0.2145 0.2425 0.2120 0.2127
(0.18,0.32) (0.15,0.29) (0.18,0.32) (0.15,0.29) (0.15,0.29)
Black -0.3397 -0.3486 -0.3341 -0.3406 -0.3432
(-0.43,-0.25) (-0.43,-0.25) (-0.43,-0.25) (-0.43,-0.25) (-0.43,-0.25)
Hispanic -0.1420 -0.1383 -0.1515 -0.1469 -0.1466
(-0.25,-0.04) (-0.24,-0.04) (-0.25,-0.05) (-0.25,-0.05) (-0.24,-0.05)
Education 0.0920 0.0915 0.0920 0.0913 0.0920
(0.07,0.12) (0.07,0.12) (0.07,0.12) (0.07,0.12) (0.07,0.12)
High School 0.3058 0.3032 0.3021 0.2953 0.2965
(0.18,0.43) (0.18,0.43) (0.18,0.43) (0.17,0.42) (0.17,0.42)
College -0.4170 -0.4210 -0.4152 -0.4183 -0.4215
(-0.59,-0.24) (-0.59,-0.25) (-0.59,-0.24) (-0.59,-0.24) (-0.59,-0.24)
Urban 0.1255 0.1115 0.1295 0.1034 0.1039
(0.04,0.22) (-0.00,0.21) (0.04,0.22) (-0.01,0.20) (-0.01,0.20)
Age 0.0013 0.0017 0.0008 0.0003 0.0012
(-0.01,0.01) (-0.01,0.01) (-0.01,0.01) (-0.01,0.01) (-0.01,0.01)
UI -0.7301 -0.8037 -0.7312 -0.7042 -0.7945
(-0.83,-0.64) (-0.93,-0.68) (-0.84,-0.63) (-0.80,-0.60) (-0.92,-0.68)
Searching 0.0189 0.2053 0.0266 0.1989 0.2080
(-0.04,0.08) (0.13,0.27) (-0.03,0.08) (0.13,0.27) (0.14,0.28)
wH market
Male 0.7198 0.7680 0.7363 0.7955 0.7942
(0.57,0.85) (0.63,0.90) (0.59,0.89) (0.65,0.94) (0.65,0.94)
Black -0.9742 -0.9468 -1.0099 -0.9761 -0.9638
(-1.13,-0.80) (-1.11,-0.78) (-1.17,-0.81) (-1.14,-0.79) (-1.13,-0.78)
Hispanic -0.1737 -0.1641 -0.2175 -0.2006 -0.1954
(-0.33,0.01) (-0.34,0.01) (-0.36,0.03) (-0.37,0.02) (-0.38,0.03)
Education 0.1875 0.1926 0.1901 0.1917 0.1955
(0.15,0.24) (0.15,0.24) (0.15,0.25) (0.15,0.25) (0.15,0.25)
High School 0.4109 0.4014 0.5206 0.5168 0.5063
(0.15,0.66) (0.15,0.66) (0.20,0.75) (0.21,0.75) (0.21,0.75)
College 0.5449 0.5331 0.4983 0.5116 0.5101
(0.02,0.81) (0.05,0.82) (0.02,0.81) (0.04,0.79) (0.04,0.81)
Urban 0.1255 0.1581 0.1295 0.1834 0.1798
(0.04,0.22) (-0.05,0.41) (0.04,0.22) (-0.01,0.45) (-0.01,0.44)
Age 0.1251 0.1243 0.1284 0.1293 0.1273
(0.11,0.14) (0.10,0.14) (0.11,0.15) (0.11,0.15) (0.11,0.15)
UI -0.7301 -0.5135 -0.7312 -0.7042 -0.5288
(-0.83,-0.64) (-0.70,-0.33) (-0.84,-0.63) (-0.80,-0.60) (-0.74,-0.33)
Searching 0.0189 -0.4354 0.0266 -0.3902 -0.4224
(-0.04,0.08) (-0.55,-0.32) (-0.03,0.08) (-0.51,-0.28) (-0.54,-0.31)
Note: 95% bootstrap intervals in parenthesis.
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Table 2.12: Wage Distributions by Eduction
Standard Data Inclusive Data
High School College High School College
Mean 12.59 17.22 16.45 20.00
Std. Dev. 24.43 15.50 142.83 37.46
25th Percentile 7.33 10.00 7.5 10.7
75th Percentile 12.36 19.17 13.24 21.63
Observations 3,343 384 10,617 1,362
Table 2.13: Likelihood Ratio Tests by Education: Weibull Hazard
Specication
(1) (2) (3) (4) unrestricted
Standard data: Highschool
lnL -14254.8164 -14248.9368 -14250.9355 -14249.8313 -14245.6054
LR test 18.4221 6.6628 10.6602 8.4517
p-value 0.0010 0.0357 0.0048 0.0036
Standard data: College
lnL -1572.5371 -1571.9408 -1572.7105 -1571.8639 -1571.8331
LR test 1.4081 0.2156 1.7548 0.0617
p-value 0.8428 0.8978 0.4159 0.8038
Inclusive data: Highschool
lnL -51367.6426 -51318.8019 -51356.6103 -51310.4165 51308.9126
LR test 117.4601 19.7785 95.3954 3.0078
p-value 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0829
Inclusive data: College
lnL -5680.1866 -5675.2052 -5673.9313 -5669.8700 -5669.7648
LR test 20.8437 10.8809 8.3330 0.2104
p-value 0.0009 0.0043 0.0396 0.6465
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Table 2.14: Likelihood Ratio Tests by Education: Piecewise Exponential Hazard
Specication
(1) (2) (3) (4) unrestricted
Standard data: Highschool
lnL -14209.8386 -14204.9645 -14208.4759 -14207.8358 -14201.4364
LR test 16.8043 7.0560 14.0789 12.7986
p-value 0.0021 0.0294 0.0009 0.0003
Standard data: College
lnL -1584.1900 -1583.1533 -1584.1869 -1583.2134 -1583.1533
LR test 2.0733 0.0001 2.0673 0.1201
p-value 0.7223 1.0000 0.3557 0.7289
Inclusive data: Highschool
lnL -51109.3769 -51070.3267 -51098.9918 -51063.9213 -51062.2604
LR test 94.2329 16.1327 73.4629 3.3218
p-value 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0684
Inclusive data: College
lnL -5626.4299 -5621.3700 -5626.3282 -5621.3424 -5621.3360
LR test 10.1878 0.0680 9.9844 0.0127
p-value 0.0701 0.9666 0.0187 0.9102
Table 2.15: Kullback-Leibler Divergence
Sub-Market DKL(pjjq) H(p)
Black High-School Non-completers 0.0589 3.5677
Black High-School Graduates 0.0764 2.9850
Black College Non-completers 0.0597 2.3401
White High-School Non-completers 0.0657 3.0358
White High-School Graduates 0.0626 2.4240
White College Non-completers 0.046 1.7345
White College Graduates 0.0905 1.6845
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Quality Hours: Measuring Labor
Input
Joint with Finn Kydland, and Peter Rupert
3.1 Introduction
Not all hours are created equal. In this paper we present a method for adjusting
aggregate hours to account for changes in the quality of hours worked. Average human
capital has rapidly increased since 1980 as better educated cohorts enter the workforce
and the baby boomers continue to work and gather experience. The neoclassical pro-
duction function, when using hours in place of labor input, treats all hours as equal,
and so measures of growth and productivity can be clouded by changes in the educa-
tion and experience level of the workforce. In order to account for these changes in the
quality of labor provided, we use data on individual workers from the Current Popu-
lation Survey's Outgoing Rotation Groups to construct a measure of labor input. We
scale each individual's hours worked by a weight, created from hourly wages, that reects
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education-experience level and an individual residual to measure relative labor input.
We show that the cyclical behavior of labor input diers from aggregate hours: labor
input is less volatile and has a slightly smaller contemporaneous correlation with real
gross domestic product. Further, the measured average annual growth rate of labor
productivity diers substantially when using labor input instead of aggregate hours. The
average annual growth rate of labor productivity since 2004 is 0.75% when using aggregate
hours, whereas labor productivity measured using labor input has an average growth
rate of only 0.22%, implying that 70% of the growth of labor productivity since 2004
has been through an increase in education and experience. That is, the \productivity
slowdown" is more severe when using labor input compared to aggregate hours, the
decline is understated by 23 percentage points. Similarly, when using labor input instead
of aggregate hours, the annual growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) decreases
from 0.63 to 0.16, implying that 75% of the growth in TFP since 1979 can be explained
by increases in the quality of the workforce. We calculate the Solow residual using both
our measures of labor input and aggregate hours and nd that the cyclical component of
the output residual remains almost unchanged. The autocorrelation of the Solow residual
drops from 0.96 to 0.94 when using labor input and the standard deviation of the error
component is unchanged at 0.007. Overall, accounting for changes in the quality if the
workforce has a large eect on the trend of productivity but a rather small eect on the
cyclical component of productivity.
With respect to Real Business Cycle (RBC) models for the economy, the volatility of
labor input in these models is lower than that of aggregate hours in data from the U.S.,
see for example Hall (1997) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), spurring the need to
either reevaluate the model or the data. Several adjustments for changes in the quality
of hours of work have been suggested in the past. Jorgenson et al. (1987), Hansen
(1993), and Denison (1957) create labor input series by weighting hours by earnings
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at broad age-sex groups. Although this does adjust hours for quality across age-sex
groups, it does not adjust for within group heterogeneity. Kydland and Prescott (1993)
attempt to solve this problem by using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to
weight hours at the individual level. The unit of time across these proposed series varies
from yearly (Jorgenson et al. (1987),Denison (1957),Kydland and Prescott (1993)), to
monthly (Hansen (1993)) thus comparing the cyclical behavior across the dierent series
is dicult. The benet of using the Current Population Survey is that hours can be
weighted at the individual level and the resulting labor input series is monthly. The
series can be updated tin a timely manner and aggregated to any level for use in further
analysis - thus combining the best of all current measures of labor input.
Recent literature commenting on the volatility of key economic series, has come to
the consensus that there has been a signicant drop in the volatility of these series in
the post-war economy, typically citing 1984 as the turing point.1 These papers focus on
aggregate hours instead of compositionally adjusted series for labor input; however, the
series proposed in this paper does not lend itself well to studying the post 1984 reduction
in volatility since it can only be constructed beginning in 1979.
3.2 Measuring Labor Input
In this section we present a model of labor input and estimate labor input using data
from the Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group since January 1979 for
private and government workers. The data include information about an individual's
usual weekly hours worked in the previous month, hourly earnings, education and other
individual characteristics. Details of the data processing can be found in section A.2.
1See for example Stock and Watson (2003), Hall (2007), Gal and van Rens (2008) and cites there
within.
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3.2.1 Model
In order to account for dierences in worker's productivity, we start start by modeling
worker i0s labor input at time t, lit, as:
lit = ihit: (3.1)
where hit is hours worked and i is the worker's individual productivity of an hour. The
aggregate labor input at time t is
Lt =
X
i
lit
=
X
i
ihit: (3.2)
We model aggregate output at time t, Yt, as a Cobb-Douglas production function with
two inputs: labor input, Lt and capital, Kt. The production function is given by:
Yt = ztK

t L
1 
t (3.3)
where zt is an aggregate shock at time t and  is capital's share of output. Assuming
markets are competitive, worker i's hourly wage is given by his marginal product of
output. The natural log of worker i's wage is:
lnwit = ln
@Yt
@hit
= ln

(1  )ztKt L t

+ ln i: (3.4)
Notice that the rst part of the right hand side of Equation 3.4 is common to all workers
and can be interpreted as the aggregate labor market conditions at time t, and the second
part of the right hand side of Equation 3.4 is the component of interest.
3.2.2 Empirical Specication
Ultimately, we are after estimating a reduced form version of Equation 3.4 to get
an estimate of i. Using the estimate of the worker's individual productivity, ^i, we can
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estimate labor input at time t using Equation 3.2. Our reduced form model for a worker's
wage is as follows:
lnwit = lnAt + ln i + i (3.5)
where At are the aggregate labor market conditions at time t and i are individual
demographic characteristics. To account for the aggregate labor market conditions we
include time xed eects which we allow to vary at the industry level, tj, where j is one
of 14 industries specied in section A.2.
We assume that the individual demographic characteristics are observable character-
istics of the worker that may aect his wage but not the productivity of an hour of work.
Specically, we assume that i is composed of race, sex and marital status:
i = 1malei + 2hispi + 3 + blacki + 4marriedi (3.6)
where malei, hispi, blacki, and marriedi are dummies for if the worker is male, hispanic,
black or married. The assumption that these characteristics do not aect the labor in-
put of the worker, and that we will ultimately not weight hours by these characteristics
warrants some discussion. Ideally we would like to give more weight to more productive
individuals; however, dierences in wage reected by, for example sex, may not reect
dierences in productivity of the individual but instead an occupational choice.2 Conse-
quently, if hours are weighted by sex, then men and women within the same occupation
whose labor input may be identical will have dierent weights. Similarly, we do not
weight hours by race since dierence in wages across race may be a reection of discrim-
ination and not dierences in labor input. This assumption stands in contrast to earlier
work by Hansen (1993) and Jorgenson et al. (1987) who weight hours by demographic
2For example, Blau et al. (2013) nd that there still exist signicant segregation of employment for
men and women across occupations and Blau and Kahn (2017) show that about one third of the gender
wage gap can be explained by dierences in the occupational choices of men and women.
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characteristics.
As noted by Kydland and Prescott (1993) however, wages are cyclical and may be
a noisy signal of productivity if a worker's wage is only observed once. For example, a
college educated worker with 10 years of experience may have a dierent wage depending
on whether he is observed during a boom or a recession. Therefore, weighting hours by
raw wages is problematic since wages may be distorted by when a worker is observed. To
avoid such distortions, we include time by industry xed eects into our reduced form
specication of the natural-log wage.
We choose the weight to be composed of education, experience and an unobservable
component i, thus our specication for the parameter of interest, i is:
ln i =
X
k
k1fedui = Ekg+ 5expi + 6exp2i + 7exp3i + 8exp4i + i (3.7)
where 1fedui = Ekg is an indicator function that takes on the value 1 if a worker's
education is in one of 5 categories: high school drop out (HSD), high school graduate
(HSG), some college (SMC), college graduate (CLG), and greater than college (GTC)
such that Ej 2 fHSD;HSG; SMC;CLG;GTCg. Our nal empirical specication of
the wage is:
lnwijt = tj + 1malei + 2hispi + 3 + blacki + 4marriedi
+
X
k
k1fedui = Ekg+ 5expi + 6exp2i + 7exp3i + 8exp4i + "ijt (3.8)
Using the estimated coecients from Equation 3.8 the estimate of worker i's weight
is:
^i = exp
X
k
^k1fedui = Ekg+ ^5expi + ^6exp2i + ^7exp3i + ^8exp4i + ^i

: (3.9)
The individual component, ^i, is the within industry-time normalized regression residual
from Equation 3.8:
^i = "^ijt   1
Njt
X
i
"^ijt (3.10)
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where Njt is the number of workers in industry j at time t. The weight is time invariant
and workers with identical observable characteristics will have almost identical weights
over time. Only the unobservable characteristics dier across observably identical work-
ers and therefore their weight will not be identical. However, more educated workers
or workers with more experience will be weighted higher than their less educated or
experienced counterparts in every year.
3.3 Findings
The standard measure of aggregate monthly hours calculated from the CPS is:
Ht =
X
i
(4:17  hit)(orgwtit): (3.11)
where hit are the usual weekly hours reported by person i in year t and orgwtit is the
Outgoing Rotation Group weight for person i at time t. Weekly hours are multiplied by
4.17 to get usual monthly hours. Using the estimated weight, Equation 3.9, aggregate
monthly labor input is:
Lt =
X
i
(4:17  ^i  hit)(orgwtit) (3.12)
Given the measure of labor input, we can nd a summary statistic of the quality of the
employed labor force by dividing labor input by aggregate hours. We dene this statistic
as workforce quality:
WQt =
Lt
Ht
(3.13)
Workforce quality tracks changes in the average labor input per hour worked. In this
section we analyze the sectoral and cyclical behaviors of aggregate hours, labor input,
workforce quality as well as labor productivity measured using both aggregate hours
(Yt=Ht) and labor input (Yt=Lt).
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3.3.1 Labor Input
Figure 3.1 plots seasonally adjusted labor input and aggregate hours derived from
the CPS as well as the hours series from the Current Employment Statistics (CES) for
comparison. As the units of the labor input series is not the same as hours from the CPS
or CES, the series are indexed to January 1979. The standard measure of hours from the
CPS and hours reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the CES track each other
closely. Labor input has a larger trend and diverges from the standard measure of hours.
Figure 3.1: Labor Input and Hours
1979 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2017
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2.0
Hours: H
CES
Labor Input: L
Table 3.1 shows the average yearly growth rate of the labor input and aggregate hours
over the entire sample and between each recession. Over all, the yearly growth rate of
labor input is 0.5 percentage points higher than that of aggregate hours. The growth rate
of both series display similar trends, with high growth rates from the early 1980's until the
2001 recession, after which both growth rates fell by nearly 1 percentage point. After the
great recession, both the growth rate of labor input and aggregate hours has increased,
although not returned to their pre-2000 levels. The largest dierence in growth rate was
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Table 3.1: Yearly Growth Rates of Hours and Labor Input
Years Hours Labor Input
1980-2016 1.27 1.97
1983-1990 2.66 3.58
1992-2000 1.93 2.38
2002-2007 1.00 1.42
2010-2016 1.51 1.90
Table 3.2: U.S. 1979Q1{2016Q4: Selected Moments
Standard
Deviation
Cross Correlation of Real Gross Domestic Product With
xt 4 xt 3 xt 2 xt 1 xt xt+1 xt+2 xt+3 xt+4
Real Gross Domestic Product 1.29 0.25 0.46 0.68 0.87 1.00 0.87 0.68 0.46 0.25
Employment 0.99 0.02 0.22 0.43 0.65 0.80 0.88 0.85 0.76 0.62
Aggregate Hours 1.27 0.03 0.22 0.44 0.66 0.82 0.89 0.86 0.76 0.61
Hours Per Worker 0.33 0.04 0.21 0.40 0.59 0.73 0.79 0.75 0.64 0.47
Labor Input 1.13 0.01 0.19 0.40 0.61 0.77 0.85 0.83 0.75 0.62
Labor Input Per Worker 0.31 -0.04 0.01 0.08 0.17 0.26 0.30 0.33 0.32 0.28
Workforce Quality 0.27 -0.10 -0.25 -0.41 -0.54 -0.60 -0.62 -0.55 -0.41 -0.26
GDP/Hour 0.77 0.37 0.40 0.39 0.36 0.31 -0.02 -0.29 -0.49 -0.59
GDP/Labor Input 0.83 0.38 0.45 0.50 0.51 0.49 0.18 -0.09 -0.32 -0.47
during 1983-1990, when the growth rate of labor input was 0.92 percentage points higher
than that of aggregate hours. These dierences in growth rates are driven by a rapid
increase in the education and experience level of the workforce beginning in the 1980's.
As well as dierences in secular trends, labor input and aggregate hours display dif-
ferences in cyclical behavior. Statistics for comparing the cyclical behavior of the two
series are created by logging and detrended the series using the Hodrick and Prescott
(1997) lter. Table 3.2 shows the standard deviation and cross correlation of real gross
domestic product (GDP) with labor input, aggregate hours and other labor market in-
dicators. Labor input and aggregate hours lag the cycle; however, the contemporaneous
correlation and rst lag correlation of labor input with real GDP are less than those of
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aggregate hours. The contemporaneous correlations of aggregate hours and employment
with real GDP are 0.82 and 0.80. The contemporaneous correlation of labor input with
GDP falls to 0.77. These results are in line with Kydland and Prescott (1993), who nd
that the contemporaneous correlation of gross national product (GNP) with labor input
is 0.75, in contrast to 0.8 for aggregate hours. These ndings are contrary to Hansen
(1993), who nds that the contemporaneous correlation of labor input with GNP is only
slightly lower than that of aggregate hours.
The rst column of Table 3.2 shows also that labor input is less volatile than aggregate
hours. Figure 3.2 plots the percent deviations from trend of aggregate hours and labor
input. The standard deviation of labor input is 1.13 whereas the that of aggregate
hours is 1.27, which constitutes an 11% decrease in volatility. This decrease is between
those found in Hansen (1993) and Kydland and Prescott (1993), who nd a decrease
in volatility of 5% and 23%, respectively. However, the volatility of aggregate hours is
much higher in previous papers since the data used ends in the mid to late 1980's before
the beginning of the great moderation. As mentioned by Hansen (1993) the dierence
in results about volatility of labor input versus aggregate hours (from those presented
here and in Kydland and Prescott (1993)) may be driven by the unit of observation.
Here, hours are weighted at the individual level whereas Hansen (1993) weights hours
at relatively broad age-sex subgroups. The contrasting results from weights constructed
from individual data versus broader groups suggest that the cyclical properties of hours
among workers within sex-age groups dier substantially.
Additionally, Table 3.2 contains statistics about hours per worker and labor input per
worker. Although the two series have similar standard deviations, their contemporaneous
correlations with GDP dier. Hours per worker is highly correlated with GDP, 0.73,
whereas labor input per worker has a contemporaneous correlation with GDP of 0.26.
These dierences may arise from the types of workers laid o during recessions. If, for
100
Quality Hours: Measuring Labor Input Chapter 3
Figure 3.2: Percent Deviation from Trend: Hours
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example, workers with the lowest labor input are laid o rst, labor input per worker
would be less positively correlated with GDP over the business cycle.
3.3.2 Workforce Quality
Given the measure of labor input, we derive a summary statistic of the quality of
the labor market by dividing labor input by aggregate hours, Equation 3.13. Workforce
quality shows changes in the average labor input per hour; Figure 3.3 plots the series.
The gure illustrates that the quality of hours worked has risen gradually since 1979.
This is consistent with the rise in the average level of experience and education of the
labor force over the past 35 years. The gure shows that the quality of the employed
workforce has risen about 30% since 1979.
Figure 3.4 plots the percent standard deviations from trend of workforce quality.
The gure reveals that the quality of the employed workforce is countercyclical and
101
Quality Hours: Measuring Labor Input Chapter 3
Figure 3.3: Quality of the Employed Workforce
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Figure 3.4: Percent Standard Deviations from Trend: Labor Quality
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has a slight phase shift in the direction of lagging the cycle. Table 3.2 gives the cross
correlations of GDP with workforce quality. The contemporaneous correlation between
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the quality of the labor force and real GNP is -0.6. The rise of labor quality during
recessions suggests that less educated and experienced workers lose their jobs rst and
the fall during booms suggests they become rehired last. The rise in the quality hours
measures during recessions can also be attributed to how workers and rms sort over the
business cycle as modeled in Lise and Robin (2017). The counter-cyclical behavior of
workforce quality is in line with the large decrease in the contemporaneous correlation
of labor input per worker with GDP.
3.3.3 Labor Productivity
Figure 3.5 plots labor productivity using labor input and aggregate hours. Both series
are indexed to January 1979. It is well known that the growth of labor productivity,
measured as GDP per aggregate hours, has fallen since the mid 2000's, see Byrne et al.
(2016) for example. But as Figure 3.5 demonstrates, labor productivity measured using
labor input has grown even substantially more slowly. In fact, GDP per labor input
was nearly at between 1980-1990 and 2004-2016. Table 3.3 gives the annualized growth
rate of quarterly labor productivity for both measures. Over the entire sample GDP per
hour grew at an annualized rate of 1.32 percent whereas GDP per labor input grew at
an annualized rate of 0.63 percent per year. Furthermore, Table 3.3 shows the average
annualized growth rates for 3 dierent time periods. First, from 1979 to 1989 the average
annual growth rate of GDP per hour was 1.14%, and the average annual growth rate of
GDP per labor input was 0.05%. This implies that the majority of productivity growth
from 1979 to 1989 came from increases in education and experience of the workforce.
Second, the average annual growth rate from 1990 to 2003 was nearly 2% for GDP per
hour and 1.47% for GDP per labor input. Although the average education and experience
of the workforce continued to increase over this period, a substantial part of the increase
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in labor productivity is attributed to other factors. Lastly, when looking at the most
recent time period, 2004 to 2016, the average annual growth rate of both measures has
decreased. The annual growth rate of GDP per hour has fallen by 62%, from 2% to
0.75% and the annual growth rate of GDP per labor input has fallen by 85% from 1.47%
to 0.22%. Again, the low growth rate of GDP per labor input implies that increases
in education and experience of the workforce account for about 70% of the growth in
productivity since 2004.
Figure 3.5: Labor Productivity
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We argue that both GDP per hour and GDP per labor input are important measures
for assessing economic growth. Since GDP per hour includes all factors that make workers
more productive, it gives a general sense of how productive the workforce is, and growth
in GDP per hour is what ultimately leads to economic growth. On the other hand, if one
is interested in what may be driving an increase in productivity, GDP per hour alone
falls short. GDP per labor input is constructed such that hours of workers with the same
years of eduction and experience are weighted the same across time. Therefore, changes
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Table 3.3: Annualized Growth Rate of Quarterly Labor Productivity
Years GDP/Hours GDP/Labor
Input
1979-2016 1.32 0.63
1979-1989 1.14 0.05
1990-2003 1.99 1.47
2004-2016 0.75 0.22
in GDP per labor input can be attributed to factors other than changes in experience
and education. Together, GDP per hour and GDP per labor input can give some insights
into what factors are driving increases in labor productivity.
Table 3.2 shows the cyclical behavior of GDP per hour and GDP per labor input.
Both series lead the cycle, however GDP per labor input has a higher contemporaneous
correlation with GDP, 0.49, than GDP per hour, 0.31. This stands in contrast to Gal
and van Rens (2008) who argue that the pro-cyclicality of labor productivity with out-
put has decreases substantially post-1984. Similarly the standard deviation the cyclical
component of GDP per labor input, 0.83, is higher than that of GDP per hour, 0.77.
3.3.4 Total Factor Productivity
Given the Cobb-Douglas structure in aggregate production, Equation 3.3, and our
measure of labor input, we can calculate total factor productivity (TFP), zt, as the Solow
residual. We measure the capital stock and capital's share of output, , as described in
Gomme and Rupert (2007). The average annual capital share of output since 1979 is
 = 0:312 and the measurement of the real capital stock from 1979 is plotted in Figure A.1
in section A.2.
Figure 3.6 shows the normalized total factor productivity since 1979 calculated us-
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ing both aggregate hours and labor input. The result is similar to labor productivity.
Table 3.4 shows that the average annual growth rate of TFP since 1979 is 0:63 when
measured using aggregate hours and 0:16 when measured using labor input.
Figure 3.6: Total Factor Productivity
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Table 3.4: Yearly Growth Rate of Total Factor Productivity
Measured Using
Years Hours Labor Input
1979-2016 0.63 0.16
1979-1989 0.56 -0.22
1990-2003 1.07 0.71
2004-2016 0.21 -0.14
Since our measure of labor input is slightly less volatile than aggregate hours over
the business cycle, TFP must capture more of the volatility in output. To see the extent
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to which TFP volatility increases when using labor input instead of aggregate hours, we
run the following AR(1) process on the estimated Solow residuals:
ln zt = 1 + 2 ln zt 1 + 3t+ t (3.14)
using both the residuals when using labor input and aggregate hours.
Table 3.5 shows the estimated coecients from Equation 3.14 using the residuals from
labor input and aggregate hours. Since labor input is less cyclical, the variance of the
error terms is slightly lower. However, the estimate is still in line with what authors
have used in the literature to calibrate models. The autocorrelation term of the residual
also drops when using labor input, but this drop is not statistically signicant. In total,
including labor input into the production function instead of aggregate hours has a large
and signicant eect on measured growth of productivity. The eects on the cyclical
component of output, however, are almost unchanged.
Table 3.5: Solow Residual Regressions
Measured Using
Years Hours Labor Input
Lag 0.964 0.946
(0.022) (0.022)
Constant -0.388 -0.599
(0.241) (0.256)
Time (10 3) 0.006 0.005
(0.005) (0.002)
SD(t) 0.0072 0.0073
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3.4 Alternative Measures
For completeness, in this section we compare our measure of labor input to commonly
used quantity indices. We use our method of weighting hours at the individual level and
compute the Laspeyres, Paasche and Fisher quantity indices.
3.4.1 Laspeyres Quantity Index
Our measure of labor input is most closely related to the Laspeyres quantity index.
Diewert (1976) suggests the following calculation as the the Laspeyres quantity index:
SQt =
P
i qitpi0P
i qi0pi0
(3.15)
where qit and pit are the quantity and price of good i at time t. Note that the Laspeyres
quantity index requires only information on prices at time 0 but quantities in all time
periods. Relating back to our measure of Labor Input, quantities qit are equivalent to
hours worked by individual i at time t, hit.
Our measure diers slightly from the Laspeyres quantity index in its measure of
prices, pi0. While the Laspeyres quantity index uses period-0 prices to weight quantities,
our measure of labor input uses a measure of the average relative price of individuals
over the entire sample, ^i. For comparison we calculate the standard Laspeyres quantity
index as follows:
SQt =
P
g ^g0hgtP
j ^g0hg0
(3.16)
where t = 0 is January of 1979. Since we do not observe the same individual over the
entire sample, g indexes education-experience groups where education can fall into one
of the ve categories dened above and experience is binned into single year categories.
The estimated price for each group ^g0 as before,
^g0 = exp
X
k
^k1fedug0 = Ekg+ ^5expg0 + ^6exp2g0 + ^7exp3g0 + ^8exp4g0

(3.17)
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where the coecients on education and experience are estimated from wages using only
observations from January 1979, i.e. t = 0. The regression on wages is as follows:
lnwij0 = j + 1malei + 2hispi + 3 + blacki + 4marriedi
+
X
k
k1fedui = Ekg+ 5expi + 6exp2i + 7exp3i + 8exp4i + "ij (3.18)
where j are industry xed eects. The main dierence between the estimated prices ^g0
from Equation 3.17 and prices used in our measure of labor input, ^i from Equation 3.9,
is the inclusion of the regression residual i which makes our labor input price vary at
the individual level instead of the group level.
3.4.2 Paasche Quantity Index
Diewert (1976) suggests the following calculation as the Paasche quantity index:
PQt =
P
i qitpitP
i qi0pit
(3.19)
where qit and pit are the quantity and price of good i at time t. The Paasche quan-
tity index requires information about both prices and quantities in every time period.
We estimate prices in every period by regressing log wages on education, experience,
demographics and an industry xed eect as in Equation 3.18. This gives an estimate
on education and experience for every month since January 1979. Figure 3.7 shows the
yearly average of the education coecients over time. The gure indicates that most of
the increase in the return to education occurred in the 1980's with college graduates earn-
ing about 80% more than high school dropouts and workers with more than sixteen years
of education earning almost double that of high school dropouts since the mid 1990's.
We use these coecients, along with those on experience, to calculate an estimated price
^gt for each education-experience group, g, for each time period, t as follows:
^gt = exp
X
k
^k1fedugt = Ekg+ ^5expgt + ^6exp2gt + ^7exp3gt + ^8exp4gt

(3.20)
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We calculate the Paasche quantity index as:
PQt =
P
g ^gthgtP
g ^gthg0
(3.21)
where hgt are the aggregate hours of group g at time t.
Figure 3.7: Education Coecients
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Figure 3.8 plots the seasonally adjusted Paasche and Laspeyres quantity indices along
with our measure of labor input and the Fisher quantity index dened as the geometric
mean of the Paasche and Laspeyres indices:
FQt =
p
Pt  St: (3.22)
All four series follow a similar pattern, having increased between 90 to 110 percent since
1979. Our measure of labor input has grown more than the alternative measures because
the individual weight used in our measure includes the regression residual. It is well
known that residual wage inequality has increased in the U.S. since the 1980's therefore,
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by weighting at the individual level, i.e. including the regression residual, accounts for
the within education-experience group heterogeneity leading to a higher level of labor
input.3
Figure 3.8: Indicies
1979 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2017
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
Paasche
Laspeyres
Fisher
Labor Input
3.4.3 Chain-Weighted Indices
We construct the the chain weighted Paasche quantity and Laspeyres quantity index
as follows:
CSQt =
P
g ^g0hg1P
j ^g0hg0

P
g ^g1hg2P
j ^g1hg1
    
P
g ^gt 1hgtP
j ^gt 1hgt 1
(3.23)
CPQt =
P
g ^g1hg1P
g ^g1hg0

P
g ^g2hg2P
g ^g2hg1
    
P
g ^gthgtP
g ^gthgt 1
(3.24)
3See for example Autor et al. (2008) or Lemieux (2006)
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where ^gt are calculated as in Equation 3.20 and hgt are the aggregate hours of education-
experience group g at time t. The chain weighted Fisher quantity index is:
CFQt =
q
CSQt  CPQt : (3.25)
Figure 3.9 plots the seasonally adjusted Paasche, Laspeyres, and Fisher quantity index
as well as our measure of labor input. Again the series show similar growth, increasing
between 100 and 110% since 1979, in contrast to standard aggregate hours, that increased
only 60% since 1979.
Figure 3.9: Chain Weighted Indices
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3.5 Conclusion
We construct an aggregate labor input series since 1979 using the Current Population
Survey. We model each individual's contribution to labor input as their hours worked
times an individual weight. We use a Mincer-type regression of wages on education,
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experience, demographics and industry to estimate the average education and experience
premium over the sample. Using the estimated education and experience premiums as
well as the regression residual we construct the individualized weights. The series for
labor input presented in this paper is a considerable improvement over past series: it is
constructed from data on individuals at a monthly frequency and updated easily with
the newest release of the CPS.
We show that labor input is less volatile over the business cycle and has a lower con-
temporaneous correlation with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) than aggregate hours.
These results stem from the fact that workforce quality is countercyclical, i.e. less edu-
cated and less experienced workers leave employment rst during recessions. We show
that workforce quality, or the average labor input per hour of work, has increased by
30% since 1979. We calculate labor productivity as GDP per labor input and show that
the average annual growth rate of labor productivity has decreased by 85% since 2004 in
contrast to 62% when using GDP per hour as a measure of labor productivity. Compar-
ing labor productivity measured using GDP per labor input and GDP per hour reveals
that the increase in education and experience accounts for about 70% of growth in labor
productivity since 2004, whereas increases in education and experience account for only
26% of growth in labor productivity between 1990 and 2003.
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A.1 Crime and the Minimum Wage
A.1.1 Proofs
Proposition 2.1 If a  a then e(a; ) = 0 for all   R(a). Where R(a) is the
workers reservation job productivity dened as Ve(
R(a); a) = Vu(a).
Proof. If a  a then Vu(a) > Vu(a), thus u(a) = 0. From (1.3) this implies g+Vp(a) 
Vu(a). The denition of 
R(a) implies that g + Vp(a)  Ve(R(a); a). Since (1.6) is
strictly increasing in  it must be the case that g+ Vp(a)  Ve(; a) for all   R(a).
Thus from (1.4), e(a; ) = 0 for all   R(a).
Proposition 2.2 If (r + )=e  (1  )= then,
a. If u(a) = 0 then for all   R(a) the worker accepts the job and e(a; w(a; )) = 0.
b. If u(a) = 1 then for all 
R(a)    D1(a) the worker accepts the job and
e(a; w(a; )) = 1.
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c. If u(a) = 1 then for all   D1(a) the worker accepts the job and e(a; w(a; )) =
0.
Proof.
a. If u(a) = 0 then Vu(a)  Vu(a), therefore the wage oered to the worker is
w(a; ) = a+ (1  )wR(a):
If  > R(a) = wR(a)=a then w(a; ) > a
R(a) + (1   )wR(a) = wR(a) since
w(a; ) is increasing in . Then Ve(w(a; ); a) > Vu(a) since Ve(w; a) is increasing in
w. Therefore the worker accepts the job. By Proposition 1, the worker forges crime
opportunities while employed, i.e. e(a; w(a; )) = 0.
b. If u(a) = 1 then Vu(a) < Vu(a)
 and the wage function is given by Equation 1.25.
If R(a) <  < wC(a)=a then the wage is given by:
w(a; ) = a+ (1  )wR(a)
Since w(a; ) is increasing in ,
aR(a) + (1  )wR(a) < w(a; ) < wC(a) + (1  )wR(a)
Plugging in for R(a) = wR(a)=a and simplifying:
wR(a) < w(a; ) < wC(a) + (1  )wR(a)
Since wR(a) < wC(a) we get
wR(a) < w(a; ) < wC(a)
If wC(a)=a <  < 
D1(a) then wage is
w(; a) =
(r +  + e)[a  (L+ rVu(a))]
r + 
+ wR(a):
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Pluggin in wC(a)=a,
w(wC(a)=a; a) =
(r +  + e)[wC(a)  (L+ rVu(a))]
r + 
+ wR(a)
=
(r +  + e)r[Vu(a)
   Vu(a)]
(r + )
+ wR(a)
> wR(a)
since Vu(a) < Vu(a)
. Plugging in Equation 1.24 for D1(a),
w(D1(a); a) =
(r +  + e)wC(a) + ewR(a)
e + (r +  + e)
  er(Vu(a)
   Vu(a))
[e + (r +  + e)](r + )(r + )
(A.1)
Now assume for contradiction that the right hand side of Equation A.1 is greater
than the crime reservation wage, wC(a), then after some algebra we get:
 (r + )(r + )e

g + 

z   rVu(a)
(r + )

  r((r + )2 + e)(Vu(a)   Vu(a)) > 0
Since the worker commits crimes while unemployed, Vu(a) < Vu(a)
 and e

g +


z rVu(a)
(r+)

> 0, therefore we get a contradiction. So it must be the case that
w(D1(a); a) < wC(a). Since the wage is larger than the reservation wage the worker
accepts the job and since the wage is less than the crime reservation wage, the worker
commits crimes on the job when given the opportunity, i.e. e(a; w(a; )) = 1.
c. If u(a) = 1 then Vu(a) < Vu(a)
 and the wage function is given by Equation 1.25. If
 > D1(a) then there are two possible wage equations. First if D1(a) <  < D2(a)
then the wage is equal to the crime reservation wage, wC(a). In this case the worker
accepts the jobs since wR(a) < wC(a) and forges crime opportunities since his wage
is equal to the crime reservation wage. Second if  > D2(a) the his wage is given
by
w(a; ) = a+ (1  )wC(a)
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Since w(a; ) is increasing in :
w(a; ) > aD2(a) + (1  )wC(a)
Plugging in for D2(a) given by Equation 1.13 and simplifying:
w(a; ) >
(r + )[wC(a)  wR(a)]
e
+ wC(a)
Since wR(a) < wC(a) it must be the case that w(a; ) > wC(a). So the worker
accepts the job and forges crime opportunities while employed, i.e. (a; w(a; )) = 0.
A.1.2 Steady State Distributions
Equating the ows from Figure 1.4 gives the following steady state distributions:
u(a) =
8>><>>:
(e + )

(a)
if a < a

jB(a) + 
if b  b
(A.2)
enc(a) =
8>><>>:
jA(a)(e + )

(a)
if a < a
jB(a)
jB(a) + 
if a  a
(A.3)
ec(a) =
8<:
jD(a)

(a)
if a < a
0 if a  a
(A.4)
p(a) =
8<:
[u(e + ) + ejD(a)]

(a)
if a < a
0 if a  a
(A.5)
where 
(a) = (e + )[(u + ) + jA(a)] + jD(a)(u + ).
117
Supplementary Materials Chapter A
A.1.3 Welfare
The average values Vi for i 2 fuc; unc; ec; enc; pg are dened as:
Vuc =
Z a
V(a)
dF (a)
F (a)
(A.6)
Vunc =
Z
a
Vu(a)
dF (a)
1  F (a) (A.7)
Vp =
Z a
Vp(a)
dF (a)
F (a)
(A.8)
Vec =
Z a
E

Ve(a; )je(a;  = 1)
dF (a)
F (a)
(A.9)
Venc =
Z a
E

Ve(a; )je(a;  = 0)

dF (a) +
Z
a
E

Ve(a; )

dF (a) (A.10)
A.1.4 Data
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997
The sample is restricted to individuals who are between the ages of 16 and 19 in
1998. Employment status in the NLSY97 is reported in weekly arrays; employment
status consists of an employer ID if employed and one of several categories, including
unemployed, if not associated with an employer. First employment status is recoded to
equal 1 if associated with an employer in a given week and 0 if unemployed, all other
categories are coded as NA's. Weekly employment status is aggregated to a monthly
status by taking the mean employment status over the month. Labor force participation
status for 1998 is calculated as the sum of months that an individual is either working
or unemployed. Individuals with labor force participations of less than 6 months are
dropped from the sample.
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Individuals report usual weekly hours and an hourly wage for up to nine jobs worked
between interview periods. Usual weekly hours from only the rst job are used to calculate
the average weekly hours worked in the sample. Average hourly wage for each individual
is calculated as the weighted average of hourly wages reported for each job; the weights
are the fraction of hours worked at each job. Individuals with an average hourly wage
less than the minimum wage in 1998, $5.15, are dropped from the sample.
At each interview, individuals are asked if they have committed a crime since their
last interview; specically, they are asked if they have stolen something worth more than
$50 or have committed any other property crime such fencing, receiving, possessing or
selling stolen property, and if so, how many times. The responses to the frequency of
crime are top coded at 99. Nine top coded individuals are dropped from the sample,
corresponding to about 0:1% of the sample. The aggregate yearly crime rate for the
sample is constructed as the sum of all times individuals stole more the $50 and committed
other property crimes divided by the number of individuals in the nal sample (2; 356).
The monthly crime rate is the yearly crime rate divided by 12.
The job nding rate is calculated as the average number of transitions from unem-
ployment to employment, without exiting the labor force in any two consecutive months
over all individuals over the 12 months in 1998. Similarly the job destruction rate is
calculated as the average number of transitions from employment to unemployment in
any two consecutive months over all individuals and months in 1998.
During round 1, individuals participated in the administration of the computer-
adaptive form of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (CAT-ASVAB) which
measures the respondents ability in 12 categories: arithmetic reasoning, electronics in-
formation, numerical operations, assembling objects, general science paragraph com-
prehension, auto information, mathematics knowledge, shop information, coding speed,
mechanical comprehension, and word knowledge. An aggregated measure of ability is
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constructed for each individual as the sum of their scores in the arithmetic reasoning,
paragraph comprehension and word knowledge categories. Sampling weights are used in
all calculations.
Uniform Crime Reports
The county level data from the Uniform Crime Reports come from the National
Archive of Criminal Justice Data1. The data include counts of arrests and oenses of
Part I oenses (murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, auto theft, and arson)
and Part II oenses (forgery, fraud, embezzlement, vandalism, weapons violations, sex
oenses, drug and alcohol abuse violations, gambling, vagrancy, curfew violations, and
runaways) at the county level. The crime rate for each county is calculated as the number
of oenses for each category in each county divided by the population of each county
divided by 100; 000. The property crime rate in each county is calculated as the sum of
all burglaries, larcenies and motor vehicle thefts divided by the population, divided by
100; 000.
County Demographics and Minimum to Median Wage Ratios
The county level demographic data come from the Survey of Epidemiology and End
Results (SEER) that provides estimates of the total population, and estimates of the
population by 19 age groups, sex and 3 race groups - white, black and other. The age
groups are aggregate to 6 groups: 0 to 14, 15 to 24, 25 to 39, 40 to 59, 60 to 79 and 80
plus. Data on the poverty rate and average household income of each county come from
1U.S. Dept. of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PRO-
GRAM DATA [UNITED STATES]: COUNTY-LEVEL DETAILED ARREST AND OFFENSE DATA,
1995-2014. ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
[producer and distributor].
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the Census' Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates.
The minimum to median wage ratios are calculated at the state level using data from
the Current Populations Outgoing Rotation Groups from 1995 to 2014. The data come
from the National Bureau of Economic Research2. The sample is restricted to individuals
between the ages of 16 and 19. The hourly wages are calculated as reported hourly wage
for hourly wage workers and weekly wages divided by usual hours worked per week for
individuals who report not working as hourly wage workers. The binding minimum wage
in each state in each year is calculated as the maximum of the state and federal minimum
wage.
A.1.5 Simulations
Panel Data Set
This data set is constructed by simulating data for 1,000 \individuals" at each unique
realization of the real binding minimum wage. The real binding minimum wage is the
maximum of the state and federal minimum wage in 1998 dollars; from 1990 to 2011
there were 204 unique levels of the real binding minimum wage across states in the US.
An individual in this simulation consists of a single draw from the estimated ability
distribution, F (^a; ^a).
For each of the 204 minimum wages, the probability of unemployment, employment
and prison for each worker is calculated. To simulate the workers expected wage, 50
realizations from the estimated productivity distribution, G(^; ^), are drawn. For each
realization the wage is calculated and the expected wage for each individual at each min-
imum wage is calculated as the mean wage across realizations of job productivities. This
process produces the nal data set which includes an expected wage and unemployment
2http://www.nber.org/cps/
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probability for each of the 1,000 individuals at each unique minimum wage.
Aggregate Data Set
The aggregate data set consists of observations of the average unemployment prob-
ability and average expected wage of all individuals in the economy. The aggregate
economy consists of 1,000 individuals and is simulated at every observed real binding
minimum wage from 1990 to 2011; there were 1,122 observed real binding minimum
wages, 50 states and Washington D.C. times 22 years. For each minimum wage, 1,000
individuals are drawn from the estimated ability distribution, F (^; ^). For each indi-
vidual, the probability of unemployment and expected wage are calculated. The expected
wage for each individual is calculated as the average wage resulting from 100 draws from
the estimated job productivity distribution. The aggregate unemployment probability
and aggregate expected wage is calculated as the weighed average across individuals; the
weights are the estimated probability of observing each type of individual, f(aj^; ^).
A.1.6 Robustness
As a robustness check for the result of the U-shaped relationship between the mini-
mum to median wage ratio on the crime rate, Table A.1 gives the estimated coecients
from Equation 1.46 without the lagged dependent variable. The results are consistent
with those found when including the lagged dependent variable in both the OLS and IV
specications.
The lagged dependent variable is included in the main specications to control for
county level time varying unobservables. As a robustness check for the dependence of
controlling for county level time varying unobservables I re-estimate Equation 1.46 and
replace the lagged dependent variable with four dierent time trends: (1) aggregate linear
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Table A.1: Non-Parametric Specication without Lagged Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Property
Burglary Larceny
Motor Vehicle
RobberyCrimes Theft
Quintile of
Min-to-Median Ratio
2nd. -15.83 7.659 8.089 -10.47 0.474
(11.15) (3.927) (7.286) (1.536) (0.487)
3rd. -127.3 -8.751 -19.17 -17.66 -2.438
(13.60) (3.833) (9.454) (1.897) (0.518)
4rd. -177.2 14.00 -10.24 -28.85 -2.163
(16.19) (4.203) (11.19) (2.045) (0.586)
5th. -116.0 24.37 12.68 -24.16 -0.441
(15.62) (4.211) (11.01) (2.029) (0.538)
N 54,780 54,780 54,780 54,780 54,780
Standard errors clustered at the county level. All specications include demographic controls,
county xed eects, household income and poverty levels.  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01, 
p < 0:001
time trend, (2) aggregate quadratic time trend, (3) state level linear time trends, (4) state
level quadratic time trends. Table A.2 shows that the U-shaped relationship between the
minimum to median wage ratio and the crime rate is robust to the inclusion of more
aggregated trends.
As a nal robustness check, I specify a parametric relationship between the minimum
to median wage ratio and the crime rate:
crimect = 1 + 2MMst + 3MM
2
st + 3Xct + 4crimect 1 + c + "ct (A.11)
Specifying a quadratic relationship between the minimum to median wage ratio and the
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Table A.2: Inclusion of Time Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Property Property Property Property
Crimes Crimes Crimes Crimes
Quintile of
Min-to-Median Ratio
2nd. -27.27 -20.75 -37.38 -21.88
(11.11) (11.00) (10.98) (10.31)
3rd. -116.9 -106.1 -131.5 -86.64
(13.54) (13.08) (13.16) (11.90)
4th. -133.6 -119.8 -168.2 -116.6
(15.33) (14.27) (13.83) (12.15)
5th. -96.97 -86.95 -114.0 -74.12
(15.33) (14.42) (14.32) (12.93)
Linear Time Trend X
Quadratic Time Trend X
State Level Linear Time Trend X
State Level Quadratic Time Trend X
N 54,780 54,780 54,780 54,780
Standard errors clustered at the county level. All specications include demographic controls,
county xed eects, household income and poverty levels.  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01, 
p < 0:001
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crime rate is more restrictive on the data than the non parametric relationship in the
main specications since it can only deliver one of three outcomes - no relationship, a
linear relationship or a quadratic relationship - whereas the nonparametric specication
can deliver any result. Table A.3 gives the estimates on the linear and squared term of the
minimum to median wage ratio. The table shows a U-shaped relationship between the
minimum to median wage ratio and the burglary, motor vehicle and robbery crime rates
since the squared term is positive and signicant. The squared term on the total property
crime rate is signicant at the 15% level. Table A.4 gives the estimated coecients when
not including a lagged dependent variable. The table shows a U-shaped relationship for
all crime categories except the larceny crime rate.
Table A.3: Robustness Check: Parametric Specication with Lagged Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Property
Burglary Larceny
Motor Vehicle
RobberyCrimes Theft
MM -1442.0 -1447.1 -552.4 -327.5 -97.67
(635.7) (198.7) (422.5) (83.00) (26.73)
MM2 541.5 904.8 319.9 152.9 55.52
(376.0) (118.4) (249.7) (48.55) (15.76)
N 51,418 51,418 51,418 51,418 51,418
Standard errors clustered at the county level. All specications include demo-
graphic controls, county xed eects, household income, poverty levels and a
lagged dependent variable.  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
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Table A.4: Robustness Check: Parametric Specication without Lagged Dependent Vari-
able
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Property
Burglary Larceny
Motor Vehicle
RobberyCrimes Theft
MM -4658.2 -1420.3 -1168.6 -702.1 -94.17
(974.2) (279.1) (680.6) (141.1) (35.56)
MM2 2372.8 898.3 703.5 345.4 53.38
(572.1) (167.1) (399.6) (82.06) (21.15)
N 54,780 54,780 54,780 54,780 54,780
Standard errors clustered at the county level. All specications include demo-
graphic controls, county xed eects, household income and poverty levels. 
p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
A.2 Quality Hours: Measuring Labor Input
A.2.1 Sample Selection and Data Cleaning
We use the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group les from the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (NBER).3 We restrict the sample to private and government workers
wage 16 or older. We construct a consistent education variable using the method de-
scribed in Jaeger (1997) and compute experience as the maximum of zero and age minus
education minus six.
We use the weekly wage variable provided by the NBER, earnwke, which includes
overtime, tips and commissions. The variable is constructed from the census variable
a-werntp from 1979 to 1993, prernwa from 1994 to 1997, and pternwa from 1998 onward.
3http://www.nber.org/cps/
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All top coded values are multiplied by 1.3. We use the usual hours worked variable
provided by the NBER, uhourse, which is constructed from the census variable a-uslhrs
from 1979 to 1993 and peernhro from 1994 onward. Between 1998 and 2002 there exist
823 observations which have a positive value for usual weekly hours and missing weekly
earnings. For these observations we impute the weekly wage. In each year we regress log
weekly earnings on a quartic in experience, dummy variables for the education groups,
high school dropout, high school graduate, some college, college graduate, and greater
than college, and dummy variables for sex, martial status, race, and state. For each year
we replace the missing weekly earnings variable with the predicted weekly wage. We
construct real hourly wages by dividing weekly earnings by usual hours per week and
deate using the Chain-type Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index to deate
wages. We replace zeros with 0.01 and log real hourly wages.
We use the industry wage variable dind from 1979 to 2002 and dind02 provided by
the NBER for a consistent industry classication. We then construct 14 broad indus-
tries: agriculture and mining, construction, utilities, manufacturing, wholesale trade,
retail trade, transportation and warehousing, information, nance and real estate, pro-
fessional and business services, education and health services, arts and entertainment,
and government.
A.2.2 Removing Jumps in Series
Due to the 1994 redesign of the CPS, all aggregate hours and labor input series have
a discontinuous jump up from December 1993 to January 1994. To remove this jump
we rst nd the average change in each series from December to January for all year
expect 1993-1994. We then multiply the rst part of each series (January 1979 through
December 1993) by a constant such that the change from December 1993 to January
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1994 is equal to the average December-January jump of all other years. We implement
this procedure on unltered, not seasonally adjusted data.
A.2.3 Seasonal Adjustment and HP Filtering
To seasonally adjust the aggregated series created from the CPS by decomposing the
series into a trend, seasonal, and irregular component. The irregular component corrects
sampling error.4 Next we aggregate the seasonally adjusted series to a quarterly frequency
and lter it into a trend and business cycle component using the Hodrick-Prescott lter
with smoothing component  = 1600.
A.2.4 Capital Stock
Figure A.1: Real Capital Stock
1979 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2017
1.0
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4See Tiller and Natale (2005) for details about including an irregular component into the decompo-
sition. See Cleveland et al. (1990) for details about the decomposition.
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